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“We will remember the 15th of December.  On this day we stopped 
speaking about a future trial for the criminals.  We began to judge them.” 
       Soviet-Jewish war correspondent and novelist Ilya Ehrenburg 
     in “Red Star” newspaper, December 18th, 1943 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the brutal history of humanity, few tragedies compare to the scale 
of death and destruction brought by Germany in the years between 1941 
and 1945 to the territories of present-day Russia, Belarus, and the Ukraine. 
During the forty-seven months of what is known in the region as The Great 
Patriotic War, approximately thirty million Soviet civilians and soldiers 
lost their lives.1  Twenty million of these were civilians.2  Over sixty years 
later, more than 2.4 million are still officially considered missing in action, 
while six of the 9.5 million buried in mass graves remain unidentified.3  
As to economic losses, David M. Glantz, an American expert on the 
German-Soviet theater of the Second World War, notes: “The degree of 
damage to the Soviet Union’s economy and military productive capability 
caused by the German invasion was equivalent to the amount of damage 
the United States would have suffered if an invading power conquered 
the entire region from the east coast across the Mississippi River into the 
eastern Great Plains.”4  Historian Norman M. Naimark put it this way: 
“Anyone who has read the historiography of the German occupation of 
Russia cannot fail to be overwhelmed by the brutality of the Nazi occupiers, 
the Wehrmacht [the regular German armed forces] included.”5 
1. NORMAN A. GRAEBNER, RICHARD DEAN BURNS & JOSEPH M. SIRACUSA, AMERICA 
AND THE COLD WAR, 1941–1991, at 145 (2010); David M. Glantz, The Soviet-German 
War 1941–45: Myths and Realities, STROM THURMOND INST. GOV’T & PUB. AFFAIRS 4 
(Oct. 11, 2001), http://sti.clemson.edu/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_details 
&gid=189&Itemid=310. 
2. Sheila Fitzpatrick, Postwar Soviet Society: The ‘Return to Normalcy’, 1945–
1953, in THE IMPACT OF WORLD WAR II ON THE SOVIET UNION 131 (Susan J. Linz ed., 
1985). 
3. Irina Titova, Medvedev Orders Precise Soviet WWII Death Toll, HUFFINGTON POST
(Jan. 27, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/01/27/medvedev-orders-precise-
s_n_161433.html. 
4. See Glantz, supra note 1, at 14.  On the German side, almost four million German
soldiers and at least one million German civilians lost their lives by the time the Red 
Army, in April 1945, captured Berlin and triumphantly raised the Soviet flag over the 
ruins of Hitler’s Reich’s Chancellery. Id. 
5. NORMAN M. NAIMARK, THE RUSSIANS IN GERMANY: A HISTORY OF THE SOVIET 
ZONE OF OCCUPATION, 1945–1949, at 7 (1995). 
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When describing what befell upon them, the people of the region often 
reference the brutal hordes of Mongol invaders in Europe during the twelfth 
and thirteenth centuries.  Such an analogy is a fair one.  Similar to the 
Mongol style of warfare, Hitler ordered the German military on its 
Eastern Front not to follow the international rules of warfare that had 
been developed by Europeans over the centuries to minimize civilian 
casualties, as well as special status recognition of captured enemy soldiers.6 
Prior to the start of military operations in June 1941, Hitler announced 
to his generals: “The war against Russia will be such that it cannot be 
fought in knightly fashion.  This struggle is one of ideologies and racial 
differences and will have to be conducted with unprecedented, unmerciful 
and unrelenting hardness.”7  Pursuant to Hitler’s instructions, the German 
generals issued specific orders to their regiments regarding how the 
upcoming invasion of the Soviet Union was to be conducted.8  This 
included the so-called “commissar order,” instructing the troops to take 
severe and decisive measures against “Bolshevik agitators” (the Soviet 
political commissars), partisans, saboteurs, and Jews.9  These orders 
provided the purported legal basis under German law for the mass 
executions of suspected political opponents and eventually Soviet Jews.10  
It also permitted the German military to conduct a policy whereby three 
million Soviet soldiers would die of starvation or cold in German POW 
camps.11 
 In the Ukraine, some of the fiercest battles between the German forces 
and the Red Army took place around Kharkov, Ukraine’s second largest 
city.12  As a result of these battles, the Kharkov region became the only 
6. STEPHEN HART, RUSSELL HART & MATTHEW HUGHES, THE GERMAN SOLDIER IN 
WORLD WAR II 94 (2000); Anthony Coates, Is the Independent Application of Jus in Bello 
the Way to Limit War?, in JUST AND UNJUST WARRIORS 183 (David Rodin & Henry Shue 
eds., 2008). 
7. MARTIN GILBERT, THE SECOND WORLD WAR: A COMPLETE HISTORY 160 (2004).
8. Yitzhak Arad, The Destruction of the Jews in German-Occupied Territories of
the Soviet Union, in THE UNKNOWN BLACK BOOK: THE HOLOCAUST IN THE GERMAN-
OCCUPIED SOVIET TERRITORIES xiv (Joshua Rubenstein & Ilya Altman eds., 2008). 
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See id.; TONY JUDT, POSTWAR: A HISTORY OF EUROPE SINCE 1945, at 19 (2005)
(“Of these [captured Soviet soldiers in the course of the war], 3.3 million died from 
starvation, exposure and mistreatment in German camps . . . .”). 
12. See generally DAVID M. GLANTZ, KHARKOV 1942: ANATOMY OF A MILITARY 
DISASTER THROUGH SOVIET EYES (2010); Kharkiv, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, http://www. 
encyclopedia.com/doc/1E1-Kharkiv.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2012). 
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Soviet territory that changed hands four times during the war.13  The 
Germans captured Kharkov and the rest of eastern Ukraine in October 
1941.14  In May 1942, the Soviet Red Army led a disastrous counter-
attack in an attempt to recapture the city.15  Hundreds of thousands of 
Red Army soldiers lost their lives in what military historian David 
Glantz calls “one of the most catastrophic offensives in Russian military 
history.”16  In February 1943, the Red Army launched another offensive, 
this time successfully liberating the city.17  Soon thereafter, German forces 
countered with another attack, recapturing Kharkov in March 1943.18  
This turned out to be the last major German victory on the Eastern Front.19  
On August 23, 1943, the Red Army carried out Operation Rumyantsev and 
finally liberated Kharkov, once and for all, from German occupation.20 
 In December 1943, the Soviet Union conducted a trial in Kharkov of 
three captured Germans and one Russian collaborator, charging them 
with the murder of Kharkov civilians, almost all Jews.21  The highly 
publicized Kharkov trial was the first trial of Germans held by any of the 
Allied Powers.22  Earlier in the year, the Soviets held a public trial at 
Krasnodar, but the defendants were all Soviet citizens tried for treason 
stemming from their collaboration with the German invaders.23  The 
Soviets had also been conducting summary military trials of captured 
Germans, followed by quick executions.24  These, however, were not 
public trials and so were virtually unknown to the outside world.25  
13. See generally I. C. B. DEAR & M. R. D. FOOT, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO WORLD 
WAR II (1995). 
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. GLANTZ, supra note 12, at xi.
17. Germans Recapture Kharkov, HISTORY.COM, http://www.history.com/this-day-
in-history/germans-recapture-kharkov (last visited Oct. 22, 2012). 
18. Id.
19. GERALD REITLINGER, THE SS, ALIBI OF A NATION, 1922–1945, at 77, 194 (1957).
20. CHRIS BELLAMY, ABSOLUTE WAR: SOVIET RUSSIA IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR
591–93 (2007). 
21. See IGNATIK FEDOROVICH KLADOV ET AL., THE PEOPLE’S VERDICT: A FULL
REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AT THE KRASNODAR AND KHARKOV GERMAN ATROCITY 
TRIALS 45–124 (1944). 
22. Nazi Captain at Kharkov Trial Blames Hitler for Murders, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
18, 1943, at 3 (“The trials, in which a group of Germans and one Russian traitor are 
defendants, are the first since the Moscow pledge by Russia, Britain and the United 
States that war criminals would be returned to the scene of their crimes and tried under 
local law.”). 
23. ARIEH J. KOCHAVI, PRELUDE TO NUREMBERG: ALLIED WAR CRIMES POLICY AND
THE QUESTION OF PUNISHMENT 64 (1998). 
24. Arieh J. Kochavi, The Moscow Declaration, the Kharkov Trial, and the Question
of a Policy on Major War Criminals in the Second World War, 76 HIST. 401, 404 (Oct. 
1991). 
25. Id.
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By contrast, the Kharkov trial was a highly publicized affair, and an 
attempt (albeit partly successful—see discussion below) by the Soviets to 
conduct a Western-style legal proceeding. 
It would take another two years, after Germany’s unconditional 
surrender in May 1945, for the Allies to organize and begin the trial of 
the so-called Major War Criminals at Nuremberg.26  The trial before the 
International Military Tribunal (“IMT”) at Nuremberg, which began in 
November 1945 and ended in October 1946, was not, in a strict sense, a 
trial of the Holocaust since the murder of the Jews was not the central 
focus at Nuremberg.27  As noted in the Judgment of the tribunal, the 
supreme crime adjudged at Nuremberg was the crime of initiating 
aggressive war, formally called “crimes against peace.”28 In Kharkov, by 
contrast, much of the focus of the trial was on the murder of the Jewish 
population of Kharkov, although the Jewish victims were never identified 
as such.29  Instead, the victims were referred to in the generic as “Soviet 
citizens”—for reasons discussed below. 
This article analyzes the Kharkov trial, the first trial of Nazi war 
criminals undertaken by any Allied Power, as well as the first trial of the 
26. Id. at 416.
27. Evidence of the murder of the Jews was not entirely absent at Nuremberg.  For
example, the Indictment speaks in Count One (titled “The Common Plan or Conspiracy”) of 
the conspirators’ “program of relentless persecution of the Jews, designed to exterminate 
them,” and concludes: “[I]t is conservatively estimated that 5,700,000 have disappeared, 
most of them deliberately put to death by the Nazi conspirators.  Only remnants of the 
Jewish population remain.” Michael R. Marrus, The Holocaust at Nuremberg, 26 YAD 
VASHEM STUDIES 3–4 (1998), available at http://www1.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/ 
Microsoft%20Word%20-%203220.pdf.  As Holocaust historian Michael Marrus points out: 
“At Nuremberg, the Jewish case was overwhelming, and largely unchallenged . . . .  [M]ore 
than 800 Nazi documents and the testimony of thirty-three witnesses were devoted, in 
whole or in part, to the question.” Id. at 31–32.  Nevertheless, of the approximately 
17,000 transcript pages recording the proceedings of the first Nuremberg trial, only a 
small portion deal with the murder of the Jews. 
28. “To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it
is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains 
within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.”  Avalon Project, Two Hundred and 
Seventeenth Day, 22 NUREMBERG TRIAL PROCEEDINGS 410, 427, http://avalon.law.yale. 
edu/imt/09-30-46.asp (last visited Oct. 22, 2012).  For analysis of the crime of aggression 
adjudged at Nuremberg as the supreme international crime, see generally Jonathan A. 
Bush, The Supreme . . . Crime and Its Origins: The Lost Legislative History of the Crime 
of Aggressive War, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2323 (2002). 
29. Alexander Prusin, “Fascist Criminals to the Gallows!”: The Holocaust and War
Crimes Trials, December 1945–February 1946, 17 HOLOCAUST AND GENOCIDE STUDIES 
1, 9 (2003), available at http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/holocaust_and_genocide_studies/ 
v017/17.1prusin.html. 
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Holocaust.30 It is written on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the 
Kharkov trial. Part II, as background, describes the Holocaust as experienced 
in Kharkov, Ukraine.  Part III discusses the trial that took place in Kharkov: 
the defendants, the prosecution, the setting, and the testimony.  Part IV 
looks at the Kharkov trial as a typical Stalinist “show trial,” where guilt has 
been predetermined and a trial is used merely as a show to its audience of 
the presupposed wrongdoings of the defendants.  In this discussion, Part 
30. The “first trial of the Holocaust” designation we have chosen for the Kharkov
trial in no way implies some taxonomic distinction between Holocaust trials and other 
trials of Nazi war criminals.  No such division exists or, for that matter, can even be 
made.  Jews were not the only victims of the Nazi racial state; as a result, individuals 
were put on trial after the war not only for the mass murder of Jews but also at the same 
time for the mass murder of non-Jews, both civilians and military.  As the IMT trial at 
Nuremberg most starkly illustrates, the central focus of many postwar Nazi war crimes 
trials was on Nazi criminality other than the murder of the Jews; and yet, at the same 
time, the murder of the Jews often played (for some trials, expressly, and for other trials, 
sub rosa) a critical part of the prosecution’s case.  Consequently, debate still rages 
among scholars about whether the IMT trial, the subsequent Nuremberg trials, and later 
trials of Nazis and collaborators helped or distorted our understanding of the Holocaust. 
See, e.g., Marrus, supra note 27, at 1; LAWRENCE DOUGLAS, THE MEMORY OF JUDGMENT:
MAKING LAW AND HISTORY IN THE TRIALS OF THE HOLOCAUST 42–43 (2001); Donald 
Bloxham, From Streicher to Sawoniuk: The Holocaust in the Courtroom, in THE 
HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE HOLOCAUST 397 (Dan Stone ed., 2004). 
Moreover, while some defendants after the war were put on trial for the murder of 
individuals who were either exclusively or primarily Jews, their victims were not described in 
the courtroom as Jews, but instead as Soviets, Poles, Hungarians or members of some 
other nationality.  The Kharkov trial is a stark example of this disconnect between how 
the Jewish victims were seen by their German perpetrators and by those who put the 
perpetrators on trial. 
Last, our use of the term of “trial of the Holocaust” for the trial at Kharkov is part of 
the formation of memory of the Holocaust in the former Soviet Union that we discuss in 
Section V, infra.  It has only been in the last two decades, since the breakup of the Soviet 
Union in 1991, that the history of the murder of the Jews at the hands of the Nazis and 
their local collaborators has been openly discussed in that part of the world. 
Historiography on this subject by local historians is also at its infancy, with most of the 
studies on the subject appearing only in the West. See generally, e.g., THE UNKNOWN 
BLACK BOOK: THE HOLOCAUST IN THE GERMAN-OCCUPIED SOVIET TERRITORIES, supra 
note 8; BITTER LEGACY: CONFRONTING THE HOLOCAUST IN THE USSR (Zvi Gitelman ed., 
1997); THE HOLOCAUST IN THE SOVIET UNION: STUDIES AND SOURCES ON THE DESTRUCTION 
OF THE JEWS IN THE NAZI-OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OF THE USSR, 1941–1945 (Lucjan 
Dobroszycki & Jeffrey S. Gurock eds., 1993). 
Our designation of the Kharkov trial as a “Holocaust trial” aims to serve the didactic 
purpose of finally bringing to the forefront the long-neglected genocide of the Jews in 
German-occupied territories of the Soviet Union. See generally GREG DAWSON, 
JUDGMENT BEFORE NUREMBERG: THE HOLOCAUST IN THE UKRAINE AND THE FIRST NAZI
WAR CRIMES TRIAL (2012) (written by the American journalist in the same vein as this 
article).  Dawson is a long-time columnist for the Orlando Sentinel, and his mother and 
her younger sister are the only known survivors of the organized massacre of Kharkov 
Jews that took place shortly after the military capture of the Kharkov region by German 
troops. Id. at 6.  “[A] very personal journey through one small corner of history,” id. at 3, 
Dawson’s book likewise seeks to shine a spotlight on the mass murder of the Jews of the 
Ukraine and this long-forgotten first war crimes trial against the Nazis. 
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IV will also explore the trial’s three audiences, the absence of the term 
“Jew” to identify the victims, and the lack of subsequent public Soviet trials 
of war criminals following the Kharkov trial.  Part V explores the 
implications of the Kharkov trial on the subsequent Nuremberg Trials, 
later postwar Nazi trials in the Soviet Union, and the role of the Kharkov 
trial in the formation of history and memory of the Holocaust in the former 
territories of the Soviet Union.  Part VI, the Conclusion, ends with a 
postscript—providing another distressing example, this one surrounding 
the Holocaust at Kharkov, of how many senior Nazis were never adequately 
punished for their crimes, with some even remembered fondly today. 
II. THE HOLOCAUST IN KHARKOV
The murder of the Jews of Kharkov in Eastern Ukraine was part of the 
“Holocaust by bullets” conducted by the German forces in the conquered 
parts of the Soviet Union, later supplemented by the murder of Soviet 
Jews by mobile gas vans.31  Soviet Jewry, therefore, experienced the 
Holocaust quite differently from their Jewish brethren in the rest of 
Europe.32 
The Jews of the Soviet Union were the first group to be targeted for 
mass extermination.33  Israeli historian Yitzhak Arad explains how Nazi 
ideology considered the creation of the U.S.S.R. to be the product of 
Eastern European Jewry, so that the term Bolshevik and Jew became 
synonymous in German eyes: “Hitler maintained that the Soviet state and 
its communist ideology were the instruments with which Jews (the rulers 
of the USSR, according to Hitler) were using to establish dominance of 
the world.  Consequently, the physical destruction of the Soviet Jews, as 
part of a Final Solution of the Jewish Question, became a means of 
simultaneously annihilating communism and the Soviet state, and of 
preparing its East European lands for German colonization.”34  A defendant 
31. HELMUT LANGERBEIN, HITLER’S DEATH SQUADS: THE LOGIC OF MASS MURDER
39 (2004); see also Maria Danilova & Randy Herschaft, Priest Uncovering the Beginnings of 
Nazi Final Solution, THE HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 31, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost. 
com/2009/01/31/priest-uncovering-the-beg_n_162865.html. 
32. LANGERBEIN, supra note 31, at 16 (“Although the Holocaust is usually associated
with factory-style gassing in the extermination camps, the Einsatzgruppen and other 
mobile execution squads accounted for almost one fourth of all Holocaust victims.”). 
33. Arad, supra note 8, at xii–xiv.
34. Id. at xiii.
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at the postwar Einsatzgruppen trial at Nuremberg explained that for the 
Nazis, “Eastern Jewry was the reservoir of Bolshevism.”35 
Following the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, special 
action murder squads known as the Einsatzgruppen followed the regular 
German army into newly conquered territory.36  Operating just behind 
the advancing German troops, these mobile killing squads would round 
up and murder all the Jews and other “undesirables” such as the Roma 
and the Sinti (commonly known as Gypsies), perceived communist political 
leaders, professionals, and “criminals,” often with assistance from the local 
populace.37  The regular German army, the Wehrmacht, also was heavily 
involved in the killings.38 
Later on, police battalions—initially organized to keep order in the 
occupied territories—joined in the killing process.39  They were supplemented 
by troops of the Waffen-SS (the military wing of the SS), the German 
Order Police, and non-German staffed auxiliary police units comprised 
of Ukrainians, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians,  Crimean Tartars, 
Belorussians, and Russians—all who participated in mass killings of 
civilians.40  As Arad explains, “A substantial number of people, particularly 
in the Baltic countries and Ukraine, collaborated with Hitler’s troops, 
and many participated in the murder of the Jews.  Without the active 
support of the local inhabitants, tens of thousands of whom served in 
police units, the Germans would not have been able to identify and 
exterminate as many Jews in the occupied territories of the Soviet 
Union.”41  Greg Dawson explains that there were so many local  
collaborators “that the Germans had a word for those who donned uniforms 
35. Walter Blume Aff., Trial No. 9, in 4 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 530–31 
(1949), quoted in THE UNKNOWN BLACK BOOK: THE HOLOCAUST IN THE GERMAN-
OCCUPIED SOVIET TERRITORIES, supra note 30, at 5. 
36. Arad, supra note 8.
37. LANGERBEIN, supra note 31, at 15; see also TIMOTHY SNYDER, BLOODLANDS:
EUROPE BETWEEN HITLER AND STALIN 276 (2010); Babi Yar, Jewish Virtual Library 
(2012), http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/babiyar.html. 
38. Arad, supra note 8, at xv.
39. See generally CHRISTOPHER R. BROWNING, ORDINARY MEN: RESERVE POLICE 
BATTALION 101 AND THE FINAL SOLUTION IN POLAND (1992) (the leading study analyzing 
the involvement of these non-army police battalions in the Holocaust). 
40. Arad, supra note 8, at xiv–xv.
41. Id. at xvi.  For further discussion, see MARTIN DEAN, COLLABORATION IN THE
HOLOCAUST: CRIMES OF THE LOCAL POLICE IN BELORUSSIA AND UKRAINE, 1941–44, at 
60–61 (2000).  Dean explains that “[o]ccasionally members of these local units participated 
directly by pulling the trigger at the pits.  However, [they] were usually left to finish the 
job afterwards; they searched diligently over the following days for any Jews who had 
escaped the roundup, murdering those they found.”  Id.  Additionally, “[l]ocal police 
collaborators are described by some witnesses as being more cruel than the Germans in 
their treatment of the Jews.”  Id. at 161–62. 
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and took up rifles against their fellow Ukrainians (and other Eastern 
European nationalities): Schultzmannschaften.”42 
The murder operations in the Ukraine were conducted by Einsatzgruppe 
C, organized with the other three Einsatzgruppen in a police academy in 
Pretzsch, a town about fifty miles southwest of Berlin.43  Einsatzgruppe C 
troops were transported to the Ukraine, where they joined the Army South, 
composed of Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS troops, which spread itself across 
the western Ukraine, including Kiev and Kharkov.44  On September 19, 
1941, German forces captured Kiev, the capital of the Ukraine.45  Ten 
days later, detachment 4a of Einsatzgruppe C, led by SS-Standartenführer 
(SS-Colonel) Paul Blobel, massacred 33,771 Kiev Jews over a period of 
two days in the ravine at Babi Yar.46 
The German forces first entered Kharkov 47 a month later, on October 
23–24, 1941.48  In November 1941, they ordered that a census of the city 
be taken, in order to identify Jews among the population.49  In December 
42. DAWSON, supra note 30, at 70.  The Schutzmannschaften were created on the
personal order of Reich leader Heinrich Himmler, head of the SS, on July 25, 1941, to 
organize “additional protective units from the ethnic groups suitable to us in the 
conquered area as soon as possible.” CHRISTOPHER R. BROWNING, THE ORIGINS OF THE
FINAL SOLUTION: THE EVOLUTION OF NAZI JEWISH POLICY, SEPTEMBER 1939–MARCH 
1942, at 274 (2004).  Browning explains: “Himmler’s order marked the official creation 
of the Schutzmannschaften, which over time became, in addition to the German security 
divisions, SS units, and Order Police battalions, a crucial element in the ‘pacification’ of 
the occupied territory.  In late 1941, 26 battalions with local policemen had been created, 
and 33,000 Schutzmänner were serving German interests; within a year this figure had 
multiplied to about 300,000 local policemen, who were deployed in a variety of functions.” Id. 
43. Arad, supra note 8, at xiv; RICHARD RHODES, MASTERS OF DEATH: THE SS-
EINSATZGRUPPEN AND THE INVENTION OF THE HOLOCAUST 3, 12 (2002). 
44. RHODES, supra note 43, at 3, 12, 15.
45. Joshua Rubenstein, The War and the Final Solution on the Russian Front, in
THE UNKNOWN BLACK BOOK: THE HOLOCAUST IN THE GERMAN-OCCUPIED SOVIET
TERRITORIES, 3, 5–6 (Joshua Rubenstein & Ilya Altman eds., 2008). 
46. Id. at 6–7, 12.
47. Tetyana Basina describes pre-war Kharkov: “Kharkov was a big industrial city
with the population about 930,000 people and around 1200 factories. . . .  It was known 
for the creation of such famous war-planes as MIG-1 and MIG-3 and tanks T-34.  [The] 
Jewish population of Kharkov consisted of almost 150,000 people.  The majority of them 
occupied leading positions at the factories and took active part in the academic life of the 
city.” Jewish Collective Memory on Holocaust: The Case of Kharkov, http://www.nbuv. 
gov.ua/portal/Soc_Gum/Mtpsa/2008/articles/Basina.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2012). 
48. Chris Webb, Operation Barbarossa 1941–1943: Timeline of the German Invasion
of the Soviet Union, HOLOCAUST EDUC. & ARCHIVE RESEARCH TEAM (2008), http://www. 
holocaustresearchproject.org/nazioccupation/opbarb.html. 
49. RAUL HILBERG, PERPETRATORS VICTIMS BYSTANDERS THE JEWISH CATASTROPHE 
1933–1945, at 91 (1992). 
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1941, the Jews of Kharkov were forced into a ghetto and then taken, in a 
similar fashion to Kiev, to the countryside to be shot.50  During this killing 
operation on December 15, 1941, at a ravine outside Kharkov known as 
Drobitsky Yar, approximately fifteen thousand Jews were murdered by 
the same detachment 4a troops and their collaborators.51  In total, Unit 
4a—according to operational field reports sent to Berlin—executed 59,018 
Jews in the Ukraine.52 
The Drobitsky Yar mass grave is only exceeded numerically by the 
mass grave at Babi Yar, but remains largely unknown today, even to the 
local population of Kharkov.53  Babi Yar, on the other hand, has achieved 
iconic status because of the poem of the same name by the great Russian 
poet Yevgenii Yevtushenko.54 
The Unknown Black Book, a compilation of testimonies from Jews 
who survived open-air massacres and other atrocities carried out by the 
Germans and their collaborators in Soviet territories, contains the testimony 
of one survivor of the Drobitsky Yar massacre, engineer S.S. Krivoruchko: 
   I, a resident of Kharkov, by nationality a Jew, by training an engineer, could 
not be evacuated from the city in October 1941, due to illness . . . .  On the 
morning of December 14, a decree was posted throughout the city from the 
German commandant of Kharkov ordering all Jews to move to barracks on the 
grounds of a tractor factory within two days; persons found in the city after 
December 16 would be shot on the spot. 
   Starting on the morning of December 15, whole columns of Jews headed out 
of the city . . . .  For many of the elderly and the handicapped, the journey from 
the city to the barracks of the tractor factory was the last of their lives.  The 
corpses of no fewer than thirty old people lay on the ground.  The program 
began at about twelve o’clock, along with the robbing of the Jews who were on 
the move.  As a result, many Jews arrived at the barracks without anything to 
their name and, more importantly, with barely any food . . . . 
   The barracks . . . were one-story, ramshackle structures, with smashed windows, 
torn away floors, and holes in the rooftops . . . .  In the room which I had found 
myself more than seventy people had arrived by evening, whereas no more than 
six to eight people would have been able to live in it under normal circumstances. 
People stood compressed against each other. . . .  From the dreadful overcrowding, 
hunger and lack of water, an epidemic of gastro-intestinal diseases broke out. . . . 
Robbery and murder were daily occurrences.  Usually, the Germans would burst 
into the room on the pretext of searching for weapons and would steal anything 
that came to mind.  In the event of any resistance, they dragged people out into 
the yard and shot them . . . . 
50. TIMOTHY SNYDER, BLOODLANDS: EUROPE BETWEEN HITLER AND STALIN 204–
05 (2010). 
51. YITZHAK ARAD, THE HOLOCAUST IN THE SOVIET UNION 191–92 (2009).
52. RHODES, supra note 43, at 178.
53. Id.
54. Yevgeni Yevtushenko, Babi Yar, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, Sept. 19, 1961.
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   On January 2, 1942, at 7:00 am . . . German sentry shouted out an order for 
everyone to gather their things and be outside in ten minutes . . . .  I went 
outside . . . .  Then German sentries and policemen formed a tight ring around 
us and announced that we were being evacuated to Poltava.  We marched out 
onto the Chuguyev-Kharkov highway but then were directed away from the 
city, although the road to Poltava ran through town.  It was obvious that they 
were not taking us to Poltava.  But where exactly we were going, nobody 
knew . . . .  Two kilometers past the last houses of the tractor factory workers’ 
quarters, they turned us in the direction of a ravine.  The ravine was strewn with 
bits of rags and the remains of torn clothing.  It became clear why they had 
brought us here.  The ravine was sealed off by a double row of sentries.  On the 
edge of the ravine stood a truck with machine guns.  Terrible scenes erupted 
when people understood that they had been brought here to be slaughtered . . . . 
Many said goodbye to each other, embracing, kissing, exchanging the last supplies 
they had . . . . 
   From the standing column, the Germans began using clubs to drive groups of 
fifty to seventy people one hundred paces or so forward, then forcing them to 
strip down to their underwear.  It was -20 or -25 degrees C.  Those undressed 
were driven down to the bottom of the ravine, from which were heard 
occasional shots and the chattering of machine guns. 
   I was in a daze and did not notice the screaming behind me.  The Germans 
began driving forward the group that I was part of.  I moved off, ready to die 
within a few minutes.  Just then, something happened: the Germans brought up 
the aged and handicapped to be executed.  The belongings of those who had 
been killed had been loaded onto these trucks and brought back to the city.  I 
moved along behind one of these vehicles.  Two young Jews were in the truck; 
the Germans had assigned them to do the loading.  In a flash, I jumped into the 
truck and asked the youngsters to cover me.  Then they hid themselves as well. 
When the truck was full, the German drivers took off with it and in this way 
took me and the two boys away from the awful ravine . . . . 
   I went to find my wife (she is not a Jew and had stayed behind in the city with 
our adopted daughter) who hid me with a girlfriend of hers.  I stayed with her 
for six and a half months.  For four months later after that I wandered from 
village to village with a false passport and, in this way, held on until February 
16, 1943, when Kharkov was liberated for the first time from the German 
occupiers.55 
Operational Situation Report USSR No. 164, transmitted from the 
field to Berlin and dated February 4, 1942, summarizes the actions taken 
regarding the Jews of Kharkov:56 
Einsatzgruppe C—Arrest of the Jews in Kharkov 
55. Rubenstein, supra note 45, at 99–103.
56. An Operational Situation Report USSR mentioning the execution in Drobitsky
Yar has never been located. 
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   The extensive preparations that became necessary in the matter of the 
arrest of the Kharkov Jews were speeded up within the framework of SK 4a 
responsibilities.  First of all, it was necessary to find a suitable area for the 
evacuation of the Jews.  This was accomplished with the closest understanding 
of the municipality’s housing department.  An area was chosen where the Jews 
could be housed in the barracks of a factory district [in Rogan on the edge of 
town]. . . . 
   The evacuation of the Jews went on without a hitch except for some robberies 
during the march of the Jews in the direction of their new quarters.  Almost 
without exception, only Ukrainians participated in the robberies.  So far, no 
report is available on the number of Jews that were arrested during the 
evacuation.  At the same time, preparation for the shooting of the Jews is 
underway.  305 Jews who have spread rumors against the German Army were 
shot immediately.57 
In his book, Judgment Before Nuremberg, Dawson tells the story of 
his mother, one of the few survivors at Drobitsky Yar, and details the 
ruthlessness of the Germans: “She [Dawson’s mother] recounted the march 
of 16,000 Jews from Kharkov to a killing field outside the city, and how 
the Nazis mocked the walking dead and took souvenir photos to send 
home to Germany.”58 
The Nazis used an alternative method of killing in the Kharkov region: 
carbon monoxide gas pumped through the exhaust of mobile death vans.59  
The Nazis first tested carbon monoxide gas on Soviet prisoners of war in 
September 1941 at the Sachsenhausen concentration camp, located north 
of Berlin.60  By the following year, approximately fifteen gas vans had 
fanned out throughout German-occupied Soviet territory to exterminate 
Jews and other “undesirables.”61  The victims were packed into the back 
of closed vans, specially sealed, while carbon monoxide was piped through 
a hose attached to the van’s tailpipe.62  The bodies were then unloaded, 
and either buried in mass graves or incinerated in open flames.63 
When the Red Army liberated Kharkov for the last time in August 1943, 
almost no Jews remained.64  That the Nazis had managed to make the 
57. Operational Situation Report USSR No. 164, HOLOCAUST EDUC. & ARCHIVE 
RESEARCH TEAM (2008), http://www.holocaustresearchproject.org/einsatz/situationreport 
164.html. 
58. DAWSON, supra note 30, at 33.
59. Rubenstein, supra note 45, at 10.
60. SAUL FRIEDLÄNDER, THE YEARS OF EXTERMINATION: NAZI GERMANY AND THE 
JEWS, 1939–1945, at 234 (2007). 
61. Id.; see also Rubenstein, supra note 45, at 10; Einsatzgruppen, AKTION REINHARD 
CAMPS, http://www.deathcamps.org/occupation/einsatzgruppen.html (last updated Mar. 2, 
2006). 
62. Einsatzgruppen, supra note 61; FRIEDLÄNDER, supra note 60, at 234.
63. Rubenstein, supra note 45, at 12; KLADOV ET AL., supra note 21, at 49.
64. Boris Polevoi, a Soviet correspondent during the war, describes Kharkov’s
streets in August, after the Germans were expelled: “Her finest buildings were destroyed 
by fire and shell, or disfigured beyond recognition.  Whole blocks stared blankly at us 
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Ukraine (including Kharkov) Judenrein is confirmed by the account of 
great Soviet Jewish writer and journalist Vassily Grossman reporting 
from the field: “There are no Jews in Ukraine.  Nowhere—Poltava, 
Kharkov, Kremenchug, Borispol, Yagotin. . . .  All is silence.  Everything 
is still.  A whole people have been brutally murdered.”65 
Grossman’s description is applicable for the rest of the Soviet territory 
occupied by the Germans.  Of the approximately 2.5 million Jews who 
were trapped in German-occupied Soviet Union, only 100,000 to 120,000 
survived.66  Most did so by joining the Jewish partisans or going into 
hiding. 67  Arad points out the aftermath: “All told, of the five million Jews 
who lived in the Soviet Union on the eve of the German attack on June 
22, 1941, about half lost their lives as a result.”68 
III. THE TRIAL
As the Red Army liberated Soviet territory, it repeatedly found mass 
graves containing remains of Jews who had been systematically 
slaughtered.69  In the Kharkov region, some of these sites were discovered 
after the first liberation in February 1943, but before the German troops 
recaptured the region a month later.70  Most of the Jews of Kharkov had 
already been murdered by that time.  The Red Army liberated Kharkov 
through paneless window-sockets.  Dzerzhinsky Square had been the handsomest and most 
spacious in pre-war Kharkov.  Its majestic architectural ensemble was now reduced to a 
wilderness of ruble and debris.  Through the ribs of the smoke-blackened skeletons of the 
sixteen-story buildings stared the leaden, sultry August sky.” BORIS POLEVOI, FROM
BELGOROD TO THE CARPATHIANS: FROM A SOVIET WAR CORRESPONDENT’S NOTEBOOK 23
(1945). 
65. The victims included Grossman’s mother, murdered in Grossman’s Ukrainian
hometown of Berdichev. Rubenstein, supra note 45, at 23. 
66. Arad, supra note 8, at xiii, xvii.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. KLADOV ET AL., supra note 21, at 46, 52.
70. Yitzhak Arad, The Holocaust as Reflected in the Soviet Russian Language
Newspapers in the Years 1941–1945, in WHY DIDN’T THE PRESS SHOUT?: AMERICAN &
INTERNATIONAL JOURNALISM DURING THE HOLOCAUST 208 (2003) (“A day after the 
liberation of Kharkov [in February 1943], Pravda wrote in an editorial: ‘Tens of 
thousands of Soviet people, Ukrainians, Russians, Jews, were shot, hanged, tortured . . . . 
It is hard to count all the bloody brutalities aimed to annihilate the Ukrainian people, to 
turn the others into slaves . . . .’  A Pravda correspondent wrote that in Kharkov ‘a 
concentration camp was discovered on Kholodnaya Gora where the Germans shot and 
starved 15,000 people. . . .  In the area of the Kharkov tractor factory the fascists shot 
14,000 Jews . . . .’”). 
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for the second and last time in August 1943.71  The defendants on trial 
were part of the German troops captured during this last liberation.72 
Earlier in the year, in July 1943, the Soviets put eleven local Soviet 
citizens who collaborated with the Nazis on trial in the northern Caucasus 
city of Krasnodar.73  After a three-day trial, the eleven Krasnodar defendants 
were found guilty of treason.74  Eight were executed and three were given 
sentences of twenty years of hard labor.75 
On November 1, 1943, the foreign ministers of the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R. issued the so-called Moscow 
Declaration.  In its final part, titled “Statement On Atrocities” and signed 
by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Premier Stalin, 
the Allies put on notice Germans participating in “atrocities, massacres 
and executions” that they would be tried for their “abominable deeds” in 
the countries where they committed those deeds.76  The Kharkov trial of 
December 1943, the first public trial of German nationals by any Allied 
power, was the Soviet signal to the Allies that they were now putting into 
practice the Moscow Declaration.77 
Three Germans and one Ukrainian were tried before a military tribunal 
constituted by the 4th Ukrainian Front of the Red Army.78  The four-day 
 
 71. BELLAMY, supra note 20, at 591–93. 
 72. CHARLES W. SYDNOR, SOLDIERS OF DESTRUCTION: THE SS DEATH’S HEAD 
DIVISION, 1933–1945, at 295 (1977). 
 73. KOCHAVI, supra note 23, at 64; see also George Ginsburgs, Laws of War and 
War Crimes on the Russian Front during World War II: The Soviet View, 11 SOVIET 
STUDIES 253, 263 (1960). 
 74. KLADOV ET AL., supra note 21, at 41. 
 75. KOCHAVI, supra note 23, at 64. 
 76. Joint Four Nation Declaration, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/moscow.asp 
(“The United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union have received from 
many quarters evidence of atrocities, massacres and cold-blooded mass executions which 
are being perpetrated by Hitlerite forces in many of the countries they have overrun and 
from which they are now being steadily expelled . . . .  Accordingly, the aforesaid three 
Allied powers, speaking in the interest of the thirty-two United Nations, hereby solemnly 
declare and give full warning of their declaration as follows: At the time of granting of 
any armistice to any government which may be set up in Germany, those German 
officers and men and members of the Nazi party who have been responsible for or have 
taken a consenting part in the above atrocities, massacres and executions will be sent 
back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that they may 
be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated countries and of free 
governments which will be erected therein . . . .  The above declaration is without prejudice to 
the case of German criminals whose offenses have no particular geographical localization and 
who will be punished by joint decision of the government of the Allies.”).  For an 
analysis of the Moscow Declaration written by a distinguished Harvard law professor at 
the time, and who later came to assist the American prosecution in Nuremberg, see 
Sheldon Gluek, Punishing the War Criminals, 109 NEW REPUBLIC 706–09 (Nov. 22, 
1943). 
 77. KOCHAVI, supra note 23, at 64; see also Ginsburgs, supra note 73, at 267. 
 78. Ginsburgs, supra note 73, at 267; see also KLADOV ET AL., supra note 21, at 41. 
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trial began on December 15, 1943, exactly two years—and purely by 
coincidence—after the German massacre of the Kharkov Jews at Drobitsky 
Yar. 
Presiding over the trial was Major of Justice General A.N. Miasnikov,79 
who, along with Major of Justice S. Zapolski and Colonel of Justice M. 
Kharchev, formed the three-judge tribunal.80  A young military colonel with 
a legal background, State Prosecutor of Justice Colonel N.K. Dunayev, 
led the prosecution of the case.81  The defendants were appointed three 
Soviet defense counsel.82  Additionally, a six-member forensic team of 
medico-legal experts served as expert witnesses in the case.83 
To accommodate the large attendance, and to provide the necessary 
gravitas to the proceedings, the trial was held in a theater auditorium, the 
Kharkov Dramatic Theater.84  The theatrical atmosphere was confirmed by 
 
 79. Biography of Major-General of Judiciary Andrei Nikolaevich Miasnikov, 
http://generals.dk/general/Miasnikov/Andrei_Nikolaevich/Soviet_Union.html (last visited 
Oct. 22, 2012).  Myasnikov was born in 1897 in the village of Kotel.  He graduated from 
the Military Academy and Military-Political Academy.  He served as both a scribe and 
clerk prior to World War I, when he enlisted as a soldier.  He served several roles before 
becoming the Chairman of the Military Tribunal of the 4th Ukrainian Front. Andrei 
Nikolaevich Myasnikov, Major General of Justice, http://voen-sud.ru/about/struktra/ 
rukovodstvo/predsedatel/istoria_vozdei/miasnikov.php (last visited Oct. 22, 2012). 
 80. KLADOV ET AL., supra note 21, at 120, 124.  For an image of the three trial 
judges, see Kharkov, Ukraine, A Nazi War Crimes Trial, December 1943, YAD VASHEM 
PHOTO ARCHIVE, http://collections.yadvashem.org/photosarchive/en-us/12699.html (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2012). 
 81. KLADOV ET AL., supra note 21, at 45; Richard E. Lauterbach, How the Russians 
Try Nazi Criminals, 190 HARPER’S MAG. 658, 659 (1945).  For an image of the lawyers 
in the trial, see Kharkov, Ukraine, Lawyers in a Nazi War Crimes Trial, December 1943, 
YAD VASHEM PHOTO ARCHIVE, http://collections.yadvashem.org/photosarchive/en-us/ 
9497.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2012). 
 82. KLADOV ET AL., supra note 21, at 45; see also Bohuslav Etcher, THE LESSONS 
OF THE KHARKOV TRIAL 4 (1944) (“The counsel were three well-known Soviet barristers.”); 
The Nuremberg Trials Were Rehearsing in Kharkov, CTR. AND FOUND. HOLOCAUST, 
http://www.holocf.ru/facts/674 (last visited Oct. 22, 2012) (“Nikolai Belov [one of the 
defense counsel] said that he learned about the process of preparing [for the Kharkov 
trial defense] in November, when he, a young specialist, was summoned to the People’s 
Commissariat.  He and his colleagues reported that they would have to speak in defense 
of the Germans in order to ensure the legitimacy of the court.  All three men were 
indignant and refused to defend the people of conscience of the crimes, but because the 
process was carried out according to the norms of the Soviet criminal law, they had to 
agree.”) (translation by authors). 
 83. KLADOV ET AL., supra note 21, at 45, 108–11. 
 84. EDMUND STEVENS, RUSSIA IS NO RIDDLE 111 (1945).  For an image of the 
courtroom, see Kharkov, Ukraine, The Courtroom of a Nazi War Crimes Trial, 
December 1943, YAD VASHEM PHOTO ARCHIVE, http://collections.yadvashem.org/photos 
archive/en-us/11899.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2012); Lauterbach, supra note 81, at 658.  
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the illumination of the auditorium with klieg lights, used to film the 
proceedings by a slew of cameras.85  The audience was rotated each day to 
ensure maximum attendance.86  Foreign correspondents were specifically 
invited to attend but, due to a glitch, only arrived on the last day of the 
trial.87 
The most knowledgeable of the foreign observers was American 
journalist Edmund Stevens.  Stevens was a seasoned Soviet “old hand” 
who first went to the Soviet Union in 1934 to study “the  Russian 
experiment” and married a Russian woman who immigrated with him 
and their son back to the United States before the war.88  In 1945, he 
published Russia Is No Riddle, describing his journeys through the 
Soviet Union before and during the Second World War.89  The book 
included a chapter about his visit to the Kharkov trial.90  Unlike some 
Westerners who became enamored with the Bolshevik revolution and so 
viewed all things Soviet in a positive light, Stevens aimed to be objective 
about what he observed.  His descriptions of the court proceedings in the 
Kharkov Dramatic Theater reflected this critical outlook.  As he noted: 
   The Russians are past masters at mis en scene,91 and the atmosphere of that 
Kharkov trial room was distinctly reminiscent of the famous Treason Trials of 
1936–38.  In fact, two of the defense lawyers, Kommodov and Kaznacheyev, 
had defended some of the figures in the treason trials.  Their presence provided 
an element of direct continuity.  This, too, was a military tribunal: judges, 
prosecutor, and attendants were all in uniform. . . . 
 
The building is also referred to as the “Ukrainian Musical Comedy Theater on Rymarskaya 
Street,” by an observer, Richard Lauterbach, who attended the trial. Id.  Lauterbach 
describes the theater as “old and smelly,” but the design was “baroque, and white sculptured 
nymphs arched against the upper boxes like so many little daughters of Atlas supporting 
the world.”  Id. 
 85. STEVENS, supra note 84, at 111–12.  Lauterbach explains that “the setting seemed 
like a Hollywood premiere. . . .” Lauterbach, supra note 81, at 658. 
 86. Ginsburgs, supra note 73, at 269; Lauterbach, supra note 81, at 658 (“Tickets 
to the proceedings went to wounded Red Army men, front-line heroes on leave, outstanding 
production workers, and families of Kharkov citizens who had been slaughtered by the 
Germans during the occupation.”). 
 87. STEVENS, supra note 84, at 111–12. (“[A]dmission tickets valid for one session 
only were distributed to factory workers and office employees through their trade union 
organizations, so that the audience kept rotating. . . .  The best Soviet writing talent was 
mobilized to cover the trial, and representatives of the Allied press were flown down to 
attend the last day’s session and witness the executions the following morning.”). 
 88. Id. at ix.  For a biography of Stevens, see generally CHERYL HECKLER, AN 
ACCIDENTAL JOURNALIST: THE ADVENTURES OF EDMUND STEVENS, 1934–1945 (2007).  
 89. STEVENS, supra note 84. 
 90. Id. at 110–29; HECKLER, supra note 88, at 246–55. 
 91. Literally translated from French as “placing on stage.”  The expression is used 
to describe the design aspects of a theatre or film production, which essentially means 
“telling a story.” 
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   During the recesses, I discovered that many of the people in the audience had 
personal knowledge or experience of the events and atrocities described, and 
had seen or known the defendants during the German occupation.  Several times 
during more gruesome bits of evidence there were stifled sobs from some 
woman—not out of pity for the defendants.  For the most part the proceedings 
took place against a background of concentrated silence.92 
The defendants were correctly characterized by Stevens as “small fry” 
and “non-entities”93—chosen to embody various ranks and generations of  
the German military command that occupied the Kharkov region.94  The 
three Germans on trial at Kharkov were: 
 Wilhelm Langheld,95 a fifty-two-year-old captain of the German 
Military Counter-Espionage Service (Abwehr) and a commander 
of a POW camp for Soviet prisoners.96  Stevens described 
Langheld as “stocky, red-headed [and] beefy-faced . . . whose 
carriage, heel-clicking, and rows of ribbons proclaimed a 
German soldier of the old school.”97 
 Hanz Ritz, an SS Untersturmführer [Second Lieutenant] in 
the Sicherheits Dienst–SD, one of the security organizations of 
the SS, and an assistant SS Company Commander of a 
Sonderkommando unit.98  Stevens described Ritz as a “Nazi 
horse of a different color from the hard-bitten Langheldt[,] . . . a 
baby-faced youth of twenty-four, with a tender little mustache.”99  
Ritz, trained in music and law, worked as a lawyer before 
being drafted into the SS to fight on the Eastern Front.100 
 
 92. STEVENS, supra note 84, at 111. 
 93. Id. at 111, 116. 
 94. Prusin, supra note 29, at 6; W.H. Lawrence, Four Nazis and ‘Traitor’ Confess 
to Mass Murders of Soviet Citizens, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1943, at 8 (the defendants 
“represent ‘three different generations of German people equally morally controlled by 
Hitlerite leaders.’”).  For an image of the defendants, see Kharkov, Ukraine, The Accused 
in a Nazi War Crimes Trial, December 1943 , YAD VASHEM PHOTO ARCHIVE, http:// 
collections.yadvashem.org/photosarchive/en-us/8716.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2012). 
 95. Lauterbach, supra note 81, at 659–60.  Langheld was a World War I veteran 
who “had been a British Prisoner of war in 1917 and ha[d] been allowed to return home 
to resume his career all over again.” Id. 
 96. KLADOV ET AL., supra note 21, at 45, 60; STEVENS, supra note 84, at 111. 
 97. STEVENS, supra note 84, at 112. 
 98. KLADOV ET AL., supra note 21, at 45, 60. 
 99. STEVENS, supra note 84, at 112–13. 
 100. KLADOV ET AL., supra note 21, at 73 (testimony of Hans Ritz); see also ETCHER, 
supra note 82, at 5 (“From April, 1941, until May, 1943, [he] worked as a lawyer in 
Poznan . . . .”). 
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 Reinhard Retzlaff, a thirty-six-year-old corporal and member 
of the 560th Group of German Secret Field Police.101  Unlike 
the other two German defendants, Retzlaff was not a Nazi 
Party member.102  Prior to the war, Retzlaff was the assistant 
manager of distribution for a newspaper in Frankfurt.103 
All three Germans were charged with playing a “direct part in [the] 
mass and brutal extermination of peaceful Soviet people by the use of 
specially equipped automobiles known as ‘murder vans,’ and also with 
having taken a personal part in mass shootings, hangings, burning, 
plunder and outrages on Soviet people.”104 
Along with the three Germans on trial, the Soviets added a Soviet 
citizen: Mikhail Bulanov, a twenty-six-year-old Ukrainian collaborator 
who worked with the Germans from October 1941 to February 1943.105  
The indictment characterized Bulanov as a shafior (chauffeur) with the 
Kharkov Sicherheits Dienst—SD.106  Bulanov was charged with “betrayal 
of the motherland . . . [and] with having taken a direct part in the mass 
extermination of the Soviet people by means of asphyxiation in ‘murder 
vans,’ with having personally shot civilian Soviet citizens, among whom 
were old people, women and children.”107 
The four defendants were charged under both international law and 
Soviet law.  The legal basis under international law was the Moscow 
Declaration issued by the Allies a month earlier announcing that Germans 
participating in atrocities would be tried by the countries where the 
atrocities took place.108  In the sphere of the Soviet legislation, on April 
19, 1943, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet [Parliament] of the 
U.S.S.R. issued a decree entitled, On measures of punishment for 
German-Fascist villains guilty of killing and torturing the Soviet population 
and captive Red Army soldiers, for spies and traitors to the Motherland 
from among Soviet citizens and their accomplices.109  The April decree 
 
 101. KLADOV ET AL., supra note 21, at 45, 60. 
 102. Id. at 60. 
 103. Id. at 75. 
 104. Id. at 60. 
 105. Id. at 60, 83 (testimony of Mikhail Bulanov). 
 106. Id. at 60. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Moscow Declaration, Oct. 30, 1943, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/ 
moscow.asp. 
 109. George Ginsburgs, Light Shed on the Story of Wehrmacht Generals in Soviet 
Capacity, 11 CRIM. L.F. 101, 105–06 (2000).  The April 19, 1943 decree reads, in pertinent part: 
1.  To mandate that German, Italian, Romanian, Hungarian and Finnish fascist 
villains implicated in the killing and torture of the civilian population and 
captive Red Army soldiers, as well as spies and traitors to the Motherland 
from among Soviet citizens, be punished by hanging. 
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became the prime legal tool for prosecution of German Nazis and their 
Soviet collaborators.110  Alexander Prusin notes, “[t]he [April] decree 
became a binding tool with which to handle all accused war criminals, 
and its very language signifies its designation as an instrument of 
deterrence against collaboration with the Germans.”111  The decree used 
the terms “atrocities” and “evil deeds” to broadly encompass the war crimes 
committed by the German (foreign) and Soviet (domestic) war criminals 
while stipulating punishment by public execution or long prison terms.112 
The German defendants appeared in court dressed in full military 
attire, which was not common at Soviet trials.113  After a public reading 
of the indictment,114 all of the defendants entered guilty pleas.115  However, 
under continental civil law legal systems, and emulated by Soviet socialist 
 
2.  Accomplices from among the local population, implicated in assisting the 
villains and engaging in reprisals and violence against the civilian 
population and captive Red Army soldiers are punished by hanging or by 
banishment to penal servitude for terms of 15 to 20 years. 
3.  The hearing of cases . . . is assigned to field courts-martial attached to 
divisions of the regular army and consisting of the chairman of the 
military tribunal of the division (chairman of the court), the chief of the 
special department of the division and the deputy commander of the 
division for political affairs (members of the court), with the participation 
of the procurator of the division. 
4. The sentences pronounced by the field courts-martial attached to divisions 
are approved by the commander of the division and put into effect 
immediately. 
5. Execution of the sentences pronounced by the field courts-martial attached 
to divisions—hanging for those sentenced to death—is carried out 
publicly, before a popular audience, and the bodies of those hanged are to 
be left on the scaffold for several days so that everyone will know what 
punishment and retribution awaits all those who commit violence and 
reprisals against the civilian population and betray their Motherland. 
Id. 
 110. KLADOV ET AL., supra note 21, at 60–61. 
 111. Prusin, supra note 29, at 4. 
 112. Id.; Harold J. Berman, Principles of Soviet Criminal Law, 56 YALE L.J. 803, 
823 (1947) (explaining that “[d]uring the war, death by hanging was introduced for 
highly malicious treason.”). 
 113. Prusin, supra note 29, at 6 (“[T]he prosecution pointed out that the decorations 
were rewards received for the atrocities committed against the Soviet people.”). 
 114. The indictment included a description of the atrocities that had been committed, 
summaries of testimony from the pre-trial interrogations of the defendants, statements of 
witnesses, and findings of the medico-legal experts.  The subsequent trial testimony, for 
the most part, was based on the text of the indictment. 
 115. KLADOV ET AL., supra note 21, at 61. 
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law, a plea of guilty is not automatically accepted by the court.116 The court 
must still be satisfied that the evidence proves the guilt.117  Additionally, 
evidence is presented to help determine what sentence should be 
rendered.118  The trial, therefore, continued despite guilty pleas. 
Undoubtedly, the Soviets did not constitute this public trial for the 
defendants merely to plead guilty and subsequently sentence them 
without giving specifics of the atrocities committed.  Almost all public 
trials held of Nazi war criminals and collaborators over the last half-
century have had a didactic component, and this first trial of the Nazis 
was no exception.  Detailed evidence of the brutal atrocities committed 
by the “Fascist-Hitlerite” invaders in the Kharkov region was going to be 
introduced during the trial, and subsequently disseminated to the outside 
world.  As confirmation of this intent, the Soviets translated excerpts of the 
proceedings into English shortly after the trial’s conclusion and published 
them in a book, The People’s Verdict.119  The book included commentary 
and also excerpts from the Krasnodar trial.120  The Soviets also produced 
a documentary, which was widely shown in Soviet theaters, though it only 
had limited screenings in the West.121 
Stevens, the American correspondent, noted that, “all legal niceties 
were observed to a fault.  The defendants and their counsel had full 
latitude to speak or interpolate, and every comma of what was said was 
translated into German for their benefit.”122  Each defendant took the stand 
and was questioned by the prosecutor, members of the tribunal, and 
defense counsel.123  George Ginsburgs commented that “[t]here [was] no 
indication . . . that the German defendants had either been rehearsed or 
coerced.”124 
The trial began with the most senior of the three German defendants 
taking the stand: Captain Wilhelm Langheld.125  He explained that the 
German High Command encouraged atrocities against civilians and 
decorated soldiers for fulfilling orders to exterminate Soviet citizens.126  
 
 116. Steven C. Thaman, The Resurrection of Trial by Jury in Russia, 31 STAN J. 
INT’L L. 61, 103 (1995). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Berman, supra note 112, at 822. 
 119. See KLADOV ET AL., supra note 21, at 45–124. 
 120. Id. at 7–44. 
 121. JANINA STRUK, PHOTOGRAPHING THE HOLOCAUST: INTERPRETATIONS OF THE 
EVIDENCE 138–39 (2004) (“In May 1945 the film of the Kharkov trials, called Atrocities 
(and also We Accuse), was screened at the Little Carnegie Hall in New York but was 
then withheld from general release.”); see also KOCHAVI, supra note 23, at 67. 
 122. STEVENS, supra note 84, at 112. 
 123. KLADOV ET AL., supra note 21, at 61–87. 
 124. Ginsburgs, supra note 73, at 269. 
 125. KLADOV ET AL., supra note 21, at 61. 
 126. Id. at 64 (testimony of Wilhelm Langheld). 
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Langheld described the use of gas vans by the German military for mass 
slaughter: 
Langheld: I saw the “gas van” in Kharkov . . . [s]ometime in May, 1942, when 
I was on a service visit to Kharkov. . . .  As far as I remember the “gas van” is a 
vehicle dark grey in colour, completely covered in, having hermetically sealed 
doors at the back. . . .  [It holds] [a]pproximately 60 to 70 persons. . . .  I was at 
76, Cherniskevsky Street at the H.Q. of the S.D. and heard a terrific noise and 
screaming outside . . . .  A gas van at that moment had driven up to the main 
entrance of the building, and one could see how many people were being 
forcibly driven into it, while German soldiers were standing at the doors of the 
van . . . .  I was a few paces away from the gas van and saw it being done . . . .  
Among the people being loaded into the gas van were old men, children, old 
and young women.  These people would not go into the machine of their own 
accord and had therefore to be driven into the gas van by S.S. men with kicks 
and blows of the butt ends of automatic rifles. . . .  I presume that these people 
guessed the sort of fate that awaited them.127  
When describing the child of a woman who was killed, Langheld 
explained: “He clung to his dead mother, crying  aloud.  The lance-
corporal who came to take away the woman’s body got tired of this so 
he shot the child. . . .  Such things happened everywhere.  It was a 
system.”128  Stevens described his observation of Langheld’s testimony: 
When the prosecutor asked Langheld whether the German High Command ever 
punished its soldiers or officers for ill treatment of civilians, he pondered a 
moment, rocking slightly back and forth on his toes and heels, and then answered, in 
the same quiet, measured voice in which his entire testimony had been delivered, 
that on the contrary such treatment was deliberately encouraged and rewarded.  
At each conclusion of his testimony, Langheldt saluted smartly, turned on his 
heels, and strode back to his seat in the prisoners’ box.129 
The next defendant to take the stand was Second-Lieutenant Hans 
Ritz, who testified that the functions fulfilled by SS troops included 
“shooting, forcible evacuations of villages, [as well as] the transportation 
and guarding of arrested persons.”130  Like Langheld, Ritz also indicated 
his awareness of “the extermination of civilian citizens in Kharkov” and 
admitted his involvement in the killings.131  Prosecutor Dunayev sought 
out Ritz’s mindset for his murderous acts: 
Prosecutor: You, Ritz, are a person of higher legal education and apparently 
consider yourself a man of culture.  How could you not only watch people being 
 
 127. Id. at 65–66. 
 128. Id. at 62–63. 
 129. STEVENS, supra note 84, at 113. 
 130. KLADOV ET AL., supra note 21, at 68 (testimony of Hans Ritz). 
 131. Id. at 71–72. 
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beaten, but even take an active part in it, and shoot perfectly innocent people, 
not only under compulsion but of your own free will? 
Ritz: I had to obey orders, otherwise I would have been court-martialed and 
certainly sentenced to death. 
Prosecutor: This is not quite so, because you yourself expressed a desire to be 
present when people were loaded on to the gas vans and nobody specially 
invited you to be there. 
Ritz: Yes, that is true.  I myself expressed a desire to be present, but I beg you 
to take into consideration that I was then still a newcomer on the Eastern Front 
and wanted to convince myself as to whether it was true that these lorries of 
which I had heard were used on the Eastern Front.  Therefore, I expressed my 
desire to be present when people were loaded on them. 
Prosecutor: But you took a direct part in the shooting of innocent Soviet citizens? 
Ritz: As I have testified earlier, during the shooting at Podvorki, Major 
Hanebitter said to me: “Show us what you are made of,” and, not wanting to get 
into trouble, I took an automatic rifle from one of the S.S. men and started firing. 
Prosecutor: Consequently, of your own free will you entered upon this vile course 
of shooting completely innocent people, as nobody had forced you to do it. 
Ritz: Yes, I must admit that.132 
Ritz also acknowledged that German policy was to ignore the laws of 
warfare on the Eastern Front: 
Prosecutor: Now, Ritz, you are a man with some knowledge of law.  Tell us, 
were the standards of international law observed to any extent by the German 
Army on the Eastern Front? 
Ritz: I must say that on the Eastern Front there was no question of international 
or any other law. 
Prosecutor: Tell us, Ritz, on whose orders did all this take place?  Why was 
this system of complete lawlessness and monstrous slaughter of perfectly 
innocent people instituted? 
Ritz: This lawlessness had its deep seated reasons.  It was instituted on the 
instructions of Hitler and his collaborators, instructions which are capable of 
detailed analysis.133 
The third defendant to take the stand was Corporal Reinhard Retzlaff.  
Retzlaff’s testimony included a description of how he participated in the 
murder of Soviet civilians:134 
Prosecutor: Tell the Court how you exterminated Soviet citizens. 
. . .  
 
 132. Id. at 72. 
 133. Id. at 71–72 (testimony of Hans Ritz). 
 134. Id. at 77. 
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Retzlaff: Every person detained by the military authorities and sent to the 
Secret Field Police for examination, was first of all beaten up.  If a prisoner 
gave the evidence we needed, the beatings were discontinued, while those who 
refused to give evidence were further beaten, and this frequently resulted in their 
death. 
Prosecutor: This means that if a person did not confess, he was murdered.  And 
if he did—he was shot. Is that correct? 
Retzlaff: Yes, that was so on most occasions. 
Prosecutor: Was there any occasion when cases were trumped up and evidence 
was faked? 
Retzlaff: Yes, all this happened and rather frequently.  One may say that this 
was quite normal procedure.135 
The final defendant to take the stand was Bulanov, who described the 
transport of medical patients from a hospital to shooting sites.  He 
acknowledged that on four occasions he drove a three-ton truck with a 
total of about 150 patients from the Kharkov Hospital to a shooting site: 
Bulanov: When I arrived at the hospital I was told to drive up to one of the 
hospital blocks.  At this moment Gestapo men began to lead out patients dressed 
only in their underwear, and load them into the trucks.  After loading, I drove 
the truck to the shooting site under German escort.  This place was approximately 
four kilometers from the city.  When we arrived at the shooting site, screams 
and sobs of patients who were already being shot filled the air.  The Germans 
shot them in front of the other patients.  Some begged for mercy and fell down 
naked in the cold mud, but the Germans pushed them into the pits and then shot 
them.136   
Bulanov also discussed a similar trip from a Children’s Hospital to transport 
children aged six through twelve for extermination.137 
Once examination of the defendants concluded, the court and counsel 
proceeded to interrogate percipient witnesses.  These included both 
Kharkov residents (including hospital personnel) who witnessed the 
atrocities as well as captured German soldiers.  None testified directly about 
the defendants on the dock.  Rather, their testimony served as background, 
adding to the overall picture of the horror that had taken place in the 
Kharkov region: mass shootings, gas van descriptions, discussions of the 
plunder of agricultural products, instructions from superiors in command 
 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 84–85 (testimony of Mikhail Bulanov). 
 137. Id. 
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(to implicate those higher ranked officials), the disgraceful prison camp 
conditions, and murder of hospital patients.138 
As part of the prosecution’s case, forensic experts from the Commission 
of Medico-Legal Experts also testified and presented a report based upon 
their examination of the various mass graves found at the Drobitsky Yar 
gully and other places in the Kharkov region.139  The expert report confirmed 
by forensic evidence that the methods of murder by the German forces 
of local civilians and POWs consisted of shooting the victims and gassing 
them through the use of carbon monoxide: 
The Medico-legal experts examined in Kharkov and neighbouring localities the 
scenes of the crimes of the German fascist invaders—the places where they 
carried out the extermination of the Soviet citizens.  These included the burned-
out block of the army hospital, where they shot and burned war prisoners—
severely wounded personnel of the Red Army; the place of the mass shooting of 
the healthy and sick, of small children, juveniles, young people, old men and 
women in the forest park of Sokolniki, near the village of Podvorki, in the 
Drobitsky gully, and in the therapeutic colony of Strelechye.  At these sites the 
medico-legal experts examined the grave-pits and exhumed bodies of Soviet 
citizens shot, poisoned, burned or otherwise brutally exterminated. 
   The medico-legal experts examined the places where the German fascist 
invaders burnt bodies to destroy evidence of their crimes—the poisoning with 
carbon monoxide.  This is the site of the conflagration on the territory of the 
barracks of the Kharkov tractor plant.  Examination of territories on which 
bodies were burnt or buried, examination of the grave-pits and positions of 
bodies in them and comparison of material thus obtained with data of the Court 
proceedings, provide grounds for considering that the number of bodies of 
murdered Soviet citizens in Kharkov and its environs reaches several tens of 
thousands, whereas the figure of 33,000 exterminated Soviet citizens given by 
accused and some witnesses is only approximate and undoubtedly too low. 
    In the 13 grave-pits opened in Kharkov and its immediate vicinity were found 
a huge number of corpses.  In most graves they lay in extreme disorder, fantastically 
intertwined, forming tangles of human bodies defying description.  The corpses 
lay in such a manner that they can be said to have been dumped or heaped but 
not buried in common graves.  In two pits in the Sokolniki forest park bodies 
were found lying in straight rows, face downward, arms bent at the elbow and 
hands pressed to faces or necks.  All the bodies had bullet wounds through the 
heads.  Such a position of the bodies was not accidental. It proves that the 
victims were forced to lie down face downward and were shot in that position.  
In the grave pits where the bodies lay and in places where the bodies had been 
burnt the medico-legal experts found articles of everyday use and personal 
effects, such as bags, sacks, knives, pots, mugs, spectacles,  fasteners of 
women’s handbags, etc.  The fact revealed by the investigation—namely, that 
before being murdered Soviet citizens were stripped of their footwear—is fully 
confirmed by the medico-legal examinations: during exhumation the experts in 
most cases discovered naked or half-naked bodies. 
 
 138. Id. at 88–106. 
 139. Id. at 108–11 (findings of the Commission of Medico-Legal Experts). 
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   In order to ascertain which Soviet citizens were exterminated and in what 
manner, the experts exhumed and examined 1,047 bodies in Kharkov and its 
environs.  These included the bodies of 19 children and adolescents, 429 women 
and 599 men.  The dead ranged in age from two to 70 years.  The fact that the 
bodies of children, adolescents, women and old men as well as invalids were 
discovered in grave-pits with civilian clothes and articles of domestic use and 
personal effects on the bodies or near them proves that the German fascist 
authorities exterminated Soviet citizens regardless of sex or age.  On the other 
hand, the fact that on bodies of young and middle-age men were found clothes 
of military cut worn in the Red Army, also articles of military equipment (pots, 
mugs, belts, etc.) is evidence of Soviet war prisoners.  
. . .  
   On the basis of all the combined data of their proceedings—the medico-legal 
experts have established the presence of:  
 
(a) A vast number of burial sites in the city of Kharkov and its immediate 
environs.  
(b) A huge number of bodies in the grave-pits.  
(c) Varying times of burial in various graves.  
(d) Varying degrees of preservation of the bodies in the same graves.  
(e) Distinction of bodies in regard to sex and age.  
(f) Uniformity of methods of extermination of human beings.  
 
   We regard the above as proofs of systematic, methodically organized, mass 
extermination of Soviet civilians and war prisoners.140 
The defense strategy was to argue that ultimate guilt for their crimes 
lay with the Nazi regime and immediate higher-ups.141  Langheld explained: 
“I fulfilled the orders of my superiors.  Had I not done so I would have 
been court-martialed.”142   Retzlaff stated: “I plead guilty to all the crimes 
I have committed upon the orders of my immediate command.”143  The 
reliance on superior orders and the defense of duress were, of course, the 
most-repeated defenses in subsequent trials of Germans and local 
accomplices by the Allies, both at Nuremberg and thereafter.144 
On the morning of December 18, 1943, after three days of testimony, 
prosecutor Dunayev gave his closing argument.145  While seeking to 
confirm that the defendants all acted on the superior orders of others, he 
argued that this should not exculpate defendants from their personal guilt.146  
 
 140. Id. 
 141. See id. at 117–20. 
 142. Id. at 65 (testimony of Wilhelm Langheld). 
 143. Id. at 82 (testimony of Reinhard Retzlaff). 
 144. KEVIN MAHONEY, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE OF THE 
HOLOCAUST 19 (1996). 
 145. KLADOV ET AL., supra note 21, at 111–17. 
 146. See id. at 114–15. 
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In so doing, Dunayev utilized an argument that was later to be used in the 
Nuremberg trials: German law itself rejected the defense of superior 
orders.147   The precedent specifically relied on by Dunayev was a result 
of the trials held in Weimar Germany after the First World War before 
the German Supreme National Tribunal at Leipzig, where German judges 
found German military defendants guilty of war crimes.148 
One of the classic decisions from the Leipzig tribunal is the Llandovery 
Castle case, where in 1921 two German naval submarine officers were 
convicted of war crimes for shooting survivors in lifeboats after torpedoing 
the British hospital ship Llandovery Castle, despite the fact that their acts of 
shooting upon the lifeboats were carried out on orders of their submarine 
captain.149   Dunayev specifically referred to this case in his closing 
argument.150 
Dunayev concluded on an emotional note.  After an obligatory nod to 
“[t]he heroic Red Army, led by the great Stalin,” he ended: 
   Concluding my speech for the prosecution, I appeal to you, citizen judges, to 
inflict severe punishment on the three base representatives of fascist Berlin, and 
on their abominable accomplice, who are sitting in the dock, to punish them for 
their bloody crimes, for the sufferings and the blood, for the tears, for the lives 
of our children, of our wives and mothers, of our sisters and brothers! 
   Today they are answering to the Soviet Court, to our people, to the whole 
world, for the felonies they committed on a scale and of a baseness far surpassing. 
   The blackest pages of human history, the horrors of the Middle Ages and of 
barbarism!  Tomorrow their superiors will have to answer—the chieftains of 
these bandits who invaded our peaceful, happy land on which our people toiled, 
reared their children, and built our free State.  I accuse Reitzlaff, Ritz, Langheld 
and Bulanov of the crimes specified in Part I of the Decree of the Presidium of 
the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., dated 19th April 1943. 
   In the name of the law and of justice, in the name of tens of thousands of 
peoples maimed and tortured to death, in the name of the entire people—I, as 
State Prosecutor, beg you, citizen judges, to sentence all four base criminals to 
death by hanging. 151 
Defense counsel did not argue with the prosecution’s request for a 
guilty verdict; only that extenuating circumstances called for the defendants’ 
lives to be spared.  Defense counsel Kommodov explained: “[T]hese 
 
 147. See id. at 114. 
 148. See id.  For a discussion of Leipzig after World War I, see, for example, GARY 
JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 
59–105 (2000); PATRICIA HEBERER AND JÜRGEN MATTHÄUS, Lessons of the Leipzig, in 
ATROCITIES ON TRIAL: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLITICS OF PROSECUTING WAR 
CRIMES 3–20 (2008). 
 149. KLADOV ET AL., supra note 21, at 11–13. 
 150. See id. at 114. 
 151. Id. at 116–17. 
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men were made into assassins by, first of all, killing their souls, and it is 
this doubt which gives me, comrades judges, the moral right to pose 
the question of the possibility of a lesser penalty than that demanded by 
the Prosecutor.”152  His colleague, defense counsel Kaznacheyev, described 
the crimes as being committed by an army where “human feelings were 
considered a weakness, and ruthlessness and fanaticism a virtue.”153  
Focusing on defendant Retzlaff, Kaznacheyev argued that because “Retzlaff 
. . . is now conscious of what he has done and has undergone a psychological 
transformation, I consider it possible to ask that his life be spared.”154  
With regard to Bulanov, the defense argued that he also had repented, 
and this should be taken into account in the determination of a final 
sentence.155 
The four defendants were allowed to make final statements.  Langheld 
stated: “I do not want to minimize my guilt in any way, but I should like 
to point out that the underlying reasons for all the atrocities and crimes 
of the Germans in Russia are to be sought in the German Government . . . .  
The Hitlerite regime has succeeded in stifling the finest feelings of the 
German people, by implanting base instincts in them.”156  According to 
Langheld, who argued that he had to follow the evil “orders or directives” 
of his superiors, that like the deceased, “I was also a victim of these 
orders and directives.”157  Retzlaff repeated the defense of compulsion: “If I 
had not obeyed these orders, I should have been put in the same position 
as my victims.”158  Bulanov begged: “I ask one thing of you, citizen judges, 
that in passing sentence you spare my life so that I may in the future 
atone for my guilt before the country.”159 
Ritz, the young lawyer, gave the most eloquent speech.  Like Langheld, 
he argued the defense of duress: “I would like to ask the Court to take 
into consideration an old principle of Roman Law: Crime under duress.  
You must believe me that if I had not obeyed orders I should have been 
arraigned before a German military tribunal and sentenced to death.”160  
 
 152. Id. at 117 (closing statement of N.V. Kommodov). 
 153. Id. at 116. 
 154. Id. at 117. 
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 156. Id. at 117–18. 
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But he then detailed particular circumstances that led him to commit his 
crimes: 
   I beg you, gentlemen of the Court, also to take into consideration the facts of 
my life.  When the Hitlerite system came to power I was a child of only thirteen.  
From that time on I was subjected to the systematic and methodical influence of 
the Hitlerite system and education in the spirit of the legend of the superiority of 
the German race; an education which taught me that only the German people 
were destined to rule, and that other nations and races were inferior and should 
be exterminated.  I was subjected to systematic training by such teachers as 
Hitler, Rosenberg and Himmler, who educated the whole German people in the 
same spirit. 
   At the beginning of the war new propaganda came from these same sources, 
although these were encountered before the war.  I have in mind the idea that 
the Russian people were uncultured and inferior.  That is what they taught us.  
Then, with total mobilization I was sent to the front.  When I reached the 
Eastern Front I was convinced that there was not a word of truth in these fables 
of Hitler, Rosenberg and others; that on the Eastern Front the Germans did not 
have the slightest understanding of any tenets of international law; that there 
was no justice here in all the actions of the German authorities.  But nothing 
remained to me but to continue along the same path.  On the Eastern Front, I 
was also convinced of another thing, namely that a system on the banner which is 
inscribed the words “murder and atrocities” cannot be a right system. 
   I realize that the destruction of this system would be an act of justice.  I am 
young.  Life is still only beginning with me.  I request you to spare my life so 
that I may devote myself to the struggle against that system.161 
The tribunal judges returned with a verdict later that evening, with 
Miasnikov announcing it five minutes before midnight.162  All four 
defendants were found guilty.163  The tribunal described the individual 
guilt of each defendant as follows: 
 Wilhem Langheld . . . personally fabricated a number of cases in 
which about 100 perfectly innocent Soviet war prisoners and 
civilians were shot . . . . 
 Hans Ritz . . . directed the shootings carried out by the S.D. 
Sonderkommando in Taganrog, and during the examination of 
prisoners beat them up with ramrods and rubber truncheons, 
thus trying to extort from them false statements . . . . 
 Reinhard Retzlaff . . . tried to extort from them [Soviet civilians] 
false statements by means of torture—plucking out their hair 
and torturing them with needles, drew up fictitious reports in 
the case of 28 arrested Soviet citizens . . . .  He personally drove 
into the “murder van” Soviet citizens doomed to death, 
 
 161. Id. 
 162. See id. at 120; Lauterbach, supra note 81, at 661. 
 163. KLADOV ET AL., supra note 21, at 123. 
BAZYLER-KHARKOV (DO NOT DELETE) 10/24/2016  5:47 PM 
[VOL. 14:  77, 2012]  The Kharkov Trial of 1943 
  SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 
 105 
accompanied the “murder van” to the place of unloading and 
took part in the burning of bodies of asphyxiated people . . . . 
 Mikhail Petrovich Bulanov, having betrayed the Socialist 
motherland, voluntarily sided with the enemy, joined the 
German service as a chauffeur with the Kharkov Gestapo 
branch, personally took part in the extermination of Soviet 
citizens by means of the “murder van,” drove peaceful Soviet 
citizens to the place of shooting and took part in the shooting 
of sixty children.164 
All four defendants were sentenced to death by hanging, with no right to 
appeal.165  As Stevens observes: “The sentence of hanging was read by 
the chief judge around midnight, in a final blaze of klieg projectors.”166 
 The next morning, on December 19, 1943 at 11 a.m., the defendants 
were publicly hanged in Kharkov City Square.167  Stevens describes the 
hanging: 
It was all over in a few moments.  The defendants were hoisted into the back of 
four open trucks and stood on stools.  Then the nooses were looped around their 
necks.  There was no blindfolding.  During the preliminaries three of the four 
prisoners had to be propped up.  Bulanov had fainted; Ritz and Retsalu [Retzlaff] 
had turned pasty white; they drooled at the mouths and their knees gave way.  
Only Langheld . . . , the old soldier, remained stiff as a ramrod throughout, 
never once flinching.  Once the nooses had been adjusted, at a signal the trucks 
pulled away and the four were left dangling and kicking in mid air.168 
In 1944, the Soviet Union released a full-length documentary of the 
trial, which has been titled We Accuse, as well as Atrocities and Justice 
 
 164. Id. at 120, 123–24. 
 165. Id. at 124. 
 166. STEVENS, supra note 84, at 115. 
 167. The New York Times describes the setting: “A crowd of about 50,000 men, 
women and children had gathered by 11 A.M.  Red army men, fur capped and with 
tommy guns slung over their shoulders, made chains around the small square inside 
which stood members of the tribunal, members of the Atrocities Commission, city 
authorities and Russian, British and American correspondents . . . .  The sky was cold 
gray and the roofs of the buildings were black with people.  Many persons stood on 
trucks to get a better view. . . .  Soviet fighter planes were flying over the square.  Newsreel 
photographers were filming the scene.  One camera was placed on a platform twenty feet 
high opposite the gallows . . . .  The Germans were in full uniform with epaulettes and 
ribbons and they wore forage caps . . . .  [After the hanging,] [l]oud cheers broke from 
the crowd.” Atrocity Killers Hanged in Kharkov, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1943, at 12. 
 168. STEVENS, supra note 84, at 115–16. 
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is Coming.169  Seven months after the trial, Life Magazine published a full 
two-page spread with photos (taken from the documentary film stills) 
and brief descriptions of the trial and its participants.170 
IV.  THE “SHOW” TRIAL 
A.  The Kharkov Trial as a Typical Stalinist Show Trial 
The show trial is one of the special hallmarks of the Stalin era and of 
Stalinism.  The first Stalinist purge trial of fellow Communist Party 
members in August 1936 typifies the process by which Soviet courts 
became instruments of political repression.171  Sixteen party leaders were 
charged in organizing a “terrorist” center on behalf of the exiled Leon 
Trotsky.172  After their arrest and interrogation, most confessed to the false 
charges, a common occurrence in such trials.173  Stalin’s instructions to the 
secret police, the NKVD, for interrogation were as follows: “Mount your 
prisoner and do not dismount until they have confessed.”174  Defendants 
 
 169. To view footage of the trial, see Utro nemetskoi kazni ili Niuremberg v Kharkove, 
Vtoraiia Mirovaiia Voiina, Kroniki [“The Morning of the German Penalty or Nuremberg 
in Kharkov, World War II Chronicles”] (translation by authors), http://war2.name/utro-
nemeckoj-kazni (last visited Feb. 2, 2012).  “A documentary film story of the Kharkov 
war criminal trials, ‘We Accuse,’ is a sober exposition of the German plot to enslave the 
world.” We Accuse, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 16, 1944, at 9. 
[The film] begins with a quotation from Stalin: “We shall bring the German 
criminals to book.”  It continues with shots of burning Russian villages and 
devastated cities and of the charred bodies of dead children.  “Be ye accursed, 
ye murderers,” the sound track shrills. 
It then presents scenes at the “trial.”  All the prisoners confess.  They tell of 
gas-filled murder vans into which victims are pushed by the score; of 
truckloads of children shot, then kicked into mass burial pits. 
When the prosecutor asked death by hanging, the audience—and the best shots 
in the film, cinematically, are audience shots—claps and roars its approval.  It 
cheers again when the verdict is pronounced.  Red army men have difficulty in 
holding back the exuberant, cheering mob when the nooses are sprung.”  It is 
“entirely sickening,” said James Agate, reviewing the film in “The Tatler,” 
adding, “and should be exhibited all over the country.” 
Robombs Change British View on Movie of Kharkov Trials, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 1944, 
at B3. 
 170. Kharkov Trial: First Pictures from Russian Movie Show Legal Trial and Death 




 171. William Chase, Stalin as Producer: the Moscow Show Trials and the Construction 
of Mortal Threats, in STALIN: A NEW HISTORY 229 (Sarah R. Davies & James R. Harris 
eds., 2005). 
 172. SIMON SEBAG MONTEFIORE, STALIN: THE COURT OF THE RED TSAR 188–89 (2003). 
 173. Id. at 184–88. 
 174. Id. at 185. 
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were told (falsely) that if they signed a confession, their lives would be 
spared.175  Prosecution witnesses were forced to provide false evidence 
by the same method.176 
For these trials, as William Chase notes, Stalin was the producer, 
controlling the show in the courtroom.177  For the August 1936 trial, Stalin 
“helped phrase the charges, decided on the slate of defendants, crafted 
the [false] evidence, and prescribed the sentences.  He even dictated 
[prosecutor Andrei] Vishinsky’s emotional speech as the grand finale of 
the trial and polished its style.”178 
Of course, “Stalin appreciated that staging a successful show trial is a 
risky affair.  A show trial requires the participation, or at least  the 
compliance, of many people (investigators, prosecutors, defence attorneys, 
judges, witnesses, the press corps, and the defendants) who act out of 
shared beliefs or under duress, although the latter motive can be most 
unpredictable.  Orchestrating such a complex undertaking is daunting.”179 
Show trials were a feature of the Soviet system even prior to Stalin.180  
Chase quotes a letter by Lenin in 1922 to the People’s Commissar of 
Justice Kursky recommending the “staging [of] a series of model trials” 
to administer “quick and forceful repression” in Moscow, Piter [Petrograd], 
Kharkov and several other important centres.”181  In his correspondence, 
Lenin stressed the importance of an “explanation of their significance to 
the popular masses through the courts and the press” and noted that “the 
educational significance of the courts is tremendous.”182  The educational 
feature of a Soviet show trial included the filming of the proceedings, 
with the wide-scale distribution of such newsreels to Soviet movie 
audiences.183 
Considering the pedigree of the trial process in Stalin’s Soviet Union 
and when it took place, it is difficult to see the Kharkov trial as anything 
other than another Stalinist show trial.184  The making of a full-length 
 
 175. Id. at 187. 
 176. J. Arch Getty, The Politics of Repression Revisited, in STALINIST TERROR: NEW 
PERSPECTIVES 54 (J. Arch Getty & Roberta T. Manning eds., 1993). 
 177. See Chase, supra note 171, at 226. 
 178. ROBERT GELLATELY, LENIN, STALIN AND HITLER: THE AGE OF SOCIAL CATASTROPHE 
270 (2009). 
 179. Chase, supra note 171, at 228. 
 180. Id. at 226. 
 181. Id. at 227. 
 182. Id. 
 183. KOCHAVI, supra note 23, at 67. 
 184. GEORGE GINSBURGS, MOSCOW’S ROAD TO NUREMBERG 54 (1996). 
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documentary film on the trial and its screenings in Soviet movie theaters 
adds to this notion.185  Even the publication in English in 1944 of the 
proceedings of the Kharkov trial, to be sold in the United States and the 
United Kingdom, is further proof that the Kharkov trial followed in the 
tradition of a typical Stalinist show trial.186 
What are the characteristics of a show trial?  Jeremy Peterson provides 
a good summary: 
[A] show trial can be defined by the presence of two elements.  The first element is 
increased probability of the defendant’s conviction resulting from the planning 
and control of the trial.  The second element is a focus on the audience outside 
of the courtroom rather than on the accused—the extent to which the trial is 
designed or managed for the benefit of external observers rather than for securing 
justice for the defendant.  The first element could be termed the reduction of the 
“element of risk to the authorities” that the defendant will be acquitted.  When 
there is no risk to the authorities, the content of the trial is predetermined, and 
the verdict is a foregone conclusion.  The second element could be termed the 
“show.”187 
It is the first element that makes the trial unfair.  Peterson quotes Elise 
Groulx Diggs, in her explanation that “all trials must contain an element 
of risk—namely the risk that the accused may be freed.  If this aspect is 
missing, what we have is a show trial, a clear lack of legitimacy, and no 
desirable legacy for the future of international criminal justice.”188 
With regard to Soviet show trials, Susan Arnold notes that there is a 
gulf difference between Soviet-style show trials and a true war crimes 
trial: “A real trial involves risk and assuming that risk is a political 
decision.”189  Why were the Nuremberg trials not show trials?  The 
consensus is because not all of the defendants were convicted.190  As 
noted by David Luban: “The best proof of the fairness of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal lies in its acquittal of such major figures of the Third Reich as 
Fritzsche, Papen, and Schacht.”191 
The second element—the show—does not necessarily make the trial 
unfair.  Rather, in addition to providing procedural due process, the trial 
can be used for a didactic purpose.  The Eichmann trial was a show trial 
in that sense as Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and prosecutor 
 
 185. KOCHAVI, supra note 23, at 67. 
 186. See KLADOV ET AL., supra note 21, at 45–124. 
 187. Jeremy Peterson, Unpacking Show Trials: Situating the Trial of Saddam Hussein, 
48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 257, 260 (2007). 
 188. Elise Groulx Diggs, Verbatim, CHAMPION, Nov. 2004, at 46. 
 189. Susan K. Arnold, Book Note, Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War 
Crimes Tribunals, 172 MIL. L. REV. 195, 196 n.5 (2002) (reviewing BASS, supra note 148). 
 190. Francine Hirsch, The Soviets at Nuremberg: International Law, Propaganda, 
and the Making of the Postwar Order, 113 AM. HIST. REV. 701, 726 (2008). 
 191. David Luban, A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 85, 
144 n.203 (2004). 
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Gideon Hausner aimed to use the trial of Eichmann to teach both young 
Israelis and the outside world about the Holocaust.  As Lawrence Douglas 
observes in his excellent The Memory of Judgment: “The Eichmann trial, 
even more explicitly than Nuremberg, was staged to teach history and 
shape collective memory.”192  For this reason, Douglas labels the Eichmann 
proceedings as “The Great Holocaust Trial.”  In Douglas’s view: 
[T]he tasks of doing justice to unprecedented crimes, clarifying a tortured history, 
and defining the terms of collective memory conjoined and collided in the most 
provocative fashion.  Indeed the Eichmann trial served to create the Holocaust: 
it helped remove an episode of unprecedented atrocity from the silences of shame, 
unexamined horror, and purposeful avoidance and transform it into an episode 
of world historical significance and collective meaning.193 
As Asli Bâli has noted: “Trials that exemplify international standards 
of accountability for atrocities are for show in the best possible sense: 
they provide a public forum for local and international audiences that 
demonstrates that justice is being served and leaders are being held 
accountable for their crimes.”194  For this reason, as Jeremy Peterson 
observes: “[T]his does not mean that all show trials are damnable.  It 
also may be true that some show trials are defensible.”195 
The Kharkov trial can be characterized as such a defensible show trial.  
While the defendants were all convicted and put to death, later postwar 
trials conducted by the Soviets of captured Germans led to acquittals and 
varying degrees of sentences, depending on the evidence produced during 
the proceedings.196  Using Luban’s fairness standard for Nuremberg 
noted above, the best proof of fairness in the Soviet postwar trials of 
Nazis in toto was the acquittal of some defendants.  In the earlier Krasnodar 
trial, not all of the collaborators were given death sentences.197  Rather, 
guilt and measures of guilt were adjudged by each defendant’s degree of 
culpability.198  The same took place in the Kharkov courtroom. 
As Kochavi observes: 
 
 192. DOUGLAS, supra note 30, at 3. 
 193. Id. at 6. 
 194. Asli Ü. Bâli, Justice Under Occupation: Rule of Law and the Ethics of Nation-
Building in Iraq, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 431, 459 (2005). 
 195. Peterson, supra note 187, at 268. 
 196. Ginsburgs, supra note 73, at 270 n.63. 
 197. KOCHAVI, supra note 23, at 64. 
 198. The differentiation in the defendants’ sentencing may be attributed to the 
defendants’ determined degree of culpability. 
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American correspondents who followed the trial [in Kharkov] and attended the 
hanging of the convicted men were generally convinced of the guilt of the 
accused and of the genuineness of the Soviets’ charges of organized atrocities.  
They thought that the Russians had been punctilious in their observance of the 
legal proprieties of the trial and found no evidence of duress.  The self-abasing 
testimony of the accused, the journalists observed, was reminiscent of the purge 
trials of the mid-1930’s.  Still, this was largely attributed to the care that had 
been exercised in selecting those who were placed on trial.199 
Unlike a paradigmatic “show trial,” whose purpose is to stage-manage 
falsehoods, the defendants on the dock in Kharkov were indeed guilty of 
the crimes accused.  From Dawson’s perspective, the Kharkov trial, 
“[s]ymbolically at least, . . . was the trial of the men who murdered my 
grandparents and great-grandparents at Drobitsky Yar.  Yes, it could have 
been worse.  They [the defendants] could have been torn to pieces by dogs.  
If this was a ‘show trial,’ it was because the victims were showing the 
perpetrators far more justice than they deserved.”200  Soviet Jewish lawyer 
Aaron N. Trainin, in the aftermath of the trial, correctly observed that in the 
Kharkov trial, defendants “were tried for the misdeeds which they 
themselves committed, with their own hands, for the crimes committed by 
them personally.”201  Justice, therefore, was meted out in Kharkov by the 
Soviet judges, although it was delivered through the vehicle most familiar 
to Soviet jurists at the time: the Stalinist show trial. 
B.  The Kharkov Trial’s Three Audiences and the                                   
Absence of Jews as Victims 
The Soviets organized the Kharkov trial for three audiences: (1) their 
domestic audience, the Soviet populace fighting for liberation from 
Germany; (2) their international audience, the U.S.S.R.’s British and 
American allies with whom they were in a common cause to defeat Nazi 
Germany; and (3) their enemy, the German military and German political 
leaders.  In this additional sense, the Kharkov trial was a “show trial,” 
where political considerations led to the creation of the judicial proceedings.  
Stalin’s strategy towards these three audiences each featured different 
considerations, and the trial was aimed to satisfy each audience. 
On the home front, Stalin used the media to publicize the trial and link 
the victories to the Red Army.202  Not only did the publicity aim to 
promote a positive image of the Soviet Union, but also a negative image 
 
 199. KOCHAVI, supra note 23, at 68. 
 200. DAWSON, supra note 30, at 289. 
 201. KOCHAVI, supra note 23, at 69 (quoting A.N. Trainin); see also Lukasz Hirszowicz, 
The Holocaust in the Soviet Mirror, in THE HOLOCAUST IN THE SOVIET UNION 29 (Lucjan 
Dobroszycki & Jeffrey S. Gurock eds., 1993). 
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of the enemy to “satisfy popular demand for revenge and to stimulate 
further hatred of the enemy.”203  In the view of American Ambassador 
Averell W. Harriman, the Kharkov trial was “meant to show Soviet citizens 
that the government was sincere in its promise to punish the Germans 
and to lose no time in doing so.”204  According to news reports at the 
time, in “[d]evoting more than two pages of their four-page editions, 
Russian papers declare the Kharkov trials are of great international 
significance, heralding the triumph of justice and bearing witness to the 
fact that criminal violations of international laws and principles will not 
remain unpunished.”205  The Soviet official daily Pravda stated that “[t]he 
sword of the Red Army and the armies of our Allies are victoriously 
preceding the sword of justice. . . .  The sword will not be sheathed until 
the leaders of the cursed Fascist band shall answer with their heads for 
their crimes against humanity.”206  In effect, Stalin wanted to keep the 
Soviet spirits high in order to ensure success in the war effort. 
On the international front, Stalin attempted to impress upon the British 
and the Americans that victory could be achieved through a legal process.  
As the Christian Science Monitor observed at the time: “The Kharkov 
executions thus seem intended to set precedents for dealing with war 
criminals: their trials need not await the end of the war, and the execution of 
those directly involved will not absolve others whose responsibility may 
seem less direct but whose policies dictated brutal methods of warfare 
against innocent populations.”207  In fact, John Balfour, the British Minister 
in Moscow, furthered this idea by stating his view that the Kharkov trial 
had been staged in order to “throw . . . a cloak of legality over past, present, 
and future hangings.”208  Harriman suggested that Stalin wanted to exhibit 
the Soviets’ determination to track down and hold responsible war 
criminals.209  Additionally, Stalin may have wanted to ensure that his 
allies, the British and Americans, would “keep their pledge about bringing 
 
 203. Id. at 67–68. 
 204. Kochavi, supra note 24, at 404–05 (citing 3 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED 
STATES 850–51 (1943)). 
 205. Lawrence, supra note 94, at 1. 
 206. Id. (quoting Pravda). 
 207. Retribution at Kharkov, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 20, 1943, at 18. 
 208. Kochavi, supra note 24, at 404 (citing Public Record Office, Kew, FO371/ 
34380, C14890, Balfour to the FO, no. 1568, Dec. 19, 1943). 
 209. Id. at 404–05. 
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‘war criminals’ to trial . . . .”210  Finally, Stalin sought to deter Germans 
from creating further harm while they were in retreat from Soviet territory 
and consequently to break the German morale.211  Harriman stated that 
the Soviets sought to create a fear of retribution among the German army 
ranks and the SS, as well as encourage the Soviet resolve “to hold 
individual Germans responsible for crimes committed by them even 
though they were acting on direct orders from their superiors.”212  An 
article in the Washington Post posits: “The Kharkov trial is a warning to 
th[e German nation], a warning not merely to Hitler and his hierarchy, 
not merely to Himmler and his menagerie of trained brutes, but also to 
the rank and file in the German army, to the German officer class, to 
Germans generally that as far as the Allies are concerned guilt will be 
personal as well as collective.”213 
In reviewing the Kharkov trial proceedings, we observe one glaring 
omission: the word evrei [Jew] is never uttered during the trial nor does 
it appear in any court document.214  Rather, the primary murder victims 
of the German invaders are described in generic terms as “civilian Soviet 
people,” “Soviet citizens,” or “peaceful civilians.”215  The initial indictment 
termed the herding of the Jews of Kharkov into a ghetto as the “forceful 
resettlement of Soviet citizens”—it hid the fact that only Jews were 
forced to ghettoize while the rest of the local population were free, for 
the most part, to go about their daily lives, albeit under German occupation.  
The absence of the term “Jew” to describe the victims in the trial at 
 
 210. Kharkov Trials, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 1943, at 5.  An editorial in the U.S.-
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Dec. 31, 1943, at 267. 
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Kharkov and its subsequent publicity is yet another element of the “show 
trial” mechanism. 
Even when different groups are mentioned, the Jews are specifically 
omitted.  In his closing address, Prosecutor Dunayev refers to the 
extermination campaign fashioned by the Nazi leaders: “It is a matter of 
common knowledge that these [atrocities at Kharkov] are no accidental 
crimes of individual Germans, but a thoroughly considered, well-worked- 
out programme for the extermination of the Russian, Ukrainian, 
Byelorussian and other peoples, . . . a system of annihilation of the 
population in the temporary occupied districts of the Soviet Union.”216  
In their verdict, the judges find Langheld guilty of “shooting . . . and 
atrocities against . . . the civilian population.”217  Ritz is also found guilty 
of “shooting of Soviet civilians.”218  Retzlaff and Bulanov “personally drove 
into the ‘murder van’ Soviet citizens doomed to death” and “personally 
took part in the extermination of Soviet citizens by means of the ‘murder 
van,’” respectively, without mentioning that it was Jews who were in 
those vans.219  The verdict also completely de-Judaizes the ghettoization 
of the Jews of Kharkov and the Drobitsky Yar massacre, referring to 
“Soviet civilians . . . [being] turned out of their houses in the town 
into barracks in the area of the Kharkov Tractor Factory.  Later they were 
taken away in groups of two to three hundred to a gully in the vicinity 
and were shot.”220 
Even the German defendants do not utter the word Jude [Jew] during 
the trial, at least in the proceedings that the Soviets published of the trial.  
A German witness, Georg Heinisch, provided a fairly accurate description 
of the mass extermination process, when information about it was still 
largely unknown, but also without mentioning the Jews: 
[Chief of Security Service in Breslau] Somann told me about the camp in 
Auschwitz in Germany where the gassing of prisoners was also carried out . . . . 
Those who were to be executed first entered a place with a signboard with 
“Disinfection” on it and there they were undressed—the men separately from 
the women and children.  Then they were ordered to proceed to another place 
with a signboard “Bath.”  While the people were washing themselves special 
valves were opened to let the gas which caused their death.  Then the dead people 
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were burned in special furnaces in which about 200 bodies could be burned 
simultaneously . . . . 
Somann told me that in the autumn of 1942 a conference took place between 
Hitler, Himmler, and S.D. Chief Kaltenbrunner, at which it was decided to 
perform executions by means of gas poisoning.221 
By that time, approximately sixty percent of the prison population of 
Auschwitz consisted of Jewish prisoners.222  Individuals selected for gassing 
upon arrival at Auschwitz were almost exclusively Jews.223 
 In publicizing the Kharkov trial, noted Soviet Jewish war correspondent 
Ilya Ehrenburg tried to correct this glaring omission against his Jewish 
brethren by writing in his dispatches “explicitly about the Jewish victims 
and descri[bing] with contempt how German officers spoke without 
emotion about helpless [Jewish] women and children, as if hoping they 
could ‘emerge dry from the water.’”224  Robert Chandler explains the Soviet 
policy of avoiding the mentioning of Jews as specific targets of the Nazi 
murder process: 
The official Soviet line . . . was that all nationalities had suffered equally under 
Hitler; the standard retort to those who emphasized the suffering of the Jews as 
“Do not divide the dead!”  Admitting that Jews constituted the overwhelming 
majority of the dead would have [also] entailed that other Soviet nationalities—
and especially Ukrainians—had been accomplices in the genocide; in any case, 
Stalin was anti-Semitic.225 
The omission of Jews from the historiography of the Great Patriotic 
War continues, unfortunately, to the present day.  In 2000, more than a 
half-century after the trial, the Drobitsky Yar Memorial Committee in 
Kharkov installed a plaque at the entrance of the Kharkov Theater to 
commemorate the trial.226  It reads, in Ukrainian: “In this building, on 
15–18 December, 1943 there took place the first trial in history of war 
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criminals for atrocities they committed against the civilian population of 
Kharkov and Kharkov region, who, according to verdict of the Military 
Tribunal of the 4th Ukrainian Front, were sentenced to death by 
hanging.”227 
C.  The Immediate Aftermath 
At the outset of the Kharkov trial, Ehrenburg wrote the following while 
sitting in the press box: 
I waited a long time for this hour.  I waited for it on the roads to France . . . .  I 
waited for it in the villages of Belarussia, and in the cities of . . . [the] Ukraine.  
I waited for the hour when these words would be heard: “The trial begins.”  
Today I heard them.  The trial commences.  On the dock, besides a traitor, three 
Germans.  These are the first.  But these are not the last.  We will remember the 
15th of December.  On this day we stopped speaking about a future trial for the 
criminals.  We began to judge them.228 
Ehrenburg’s words did not come to pass.  The Kharkov trial was not 
succeeded by other Soviet public trials of captured Nazis.229  After Kharkov, 
Stalin acceded to Churchill’s and Roosevelt’s request not to conduct any 
more high-profile prosecutions of captured Germans for fear that the 
Nazis would put on trial captured Western POWs.230  The documentary 
film of the trial was soon taken off Soviet screens. 
 
 227. Id. 
 228. Volovik, supra note 226 (quoting I.G. Ehrenburg, War April 1943–March 
1944, MEMOIRS (1944)).  Soviet newspapers at the time (December 1943–January 1944), 
indicated the belief that more trials were to come: “The newspaper War and the Working 
Class today replied to foreign criticism of the Kharkov war criminal trials and asserted 
this was ‘only one of the first blows inflicted upon the hideous fascist beast.’” More 
Trials of Nazis Likely Soon in Russia: Newspaper Says Kharkov Hangings Were Only 
‘First Blows’, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1944, at 3. 
 229. GINSBURGS, supra note 184, at 55–56. 
 230. After Kharkov, Germany threatened to retaliate against British and American 
prisoners of war.  Nazis Hint Death for Yank Flyers, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1943, at 3.  
Although the United States held more Germans than the Germans held American 
soldiers, “policy requires the American and British governments to present a common 
front in a life and death issue of this kind and regard for their soldiers in German hands 
as a unit.  On that basis, the Nazis still h[e]ld the numerical advantage.” Ernest Lindley, 
Kharkov Trials, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 1943, at 9.  It was far more important to protect 
the lives of the soldiers than to allow the Soviet Union to conduct more public trials of 
war criminals while the war was still going on.  Based on the foregoing, and the lack of 
public Soviet trials of Nazis after Kharkov until the war had ended, it appears as though 
Soviets acceded to the Allies request. 
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For the rest of the war, the Soviets returned to their pre-Kharkov trial 
behavior of trying captured Nazis in secret.231  The only evidence of such 
trials was their aftermath: the sudden appearance of gallows with dead 
men hanging from them.232  Most of these, however, were of local 
collaborators and used to send a stern message to those who would collude 
with the German occupiers.233 
V.  IMPLICATIONS OF THE KHARKOV TRIAL ON SUBSEQUENT                      
ALLIED TRIALS OF “WAR CRIMINALS” 
A.  Implications on the Nuremberg Tribunal 
A Czech jurist, Bohuslav Etcher, sitting on the British-created United 
Nations Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes, wrote in a 
January 1944 analysis of the Kharkov trial: “The Kharkov trial was a 
beginning, a very necessary beginning. . . .  We talk constantly of 
reconstruction.  We can reconstruct devastated factories.  We can build 
up bombed houses . . . .  But in our task of reconstruction we must give 
some sort of priority to the reconstruction—on new foundations—of the 
law.”234  A British colleague, writing in the same pamphlet, explained: 
 
 231. GINSBURGS, supra note 184, at 55–56. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Tanja Penter, Collaboration on Trial: New Source Material on Soviet Postwar 
Trials against Collaborators, 46 SLAVIC REV. 782, 783, 788 (2005); DEAN, supra note 
41, at 148 (“For local policemen the fear of Soviet retribution was sufficient to persuade 
most to leave with the Germans . . . .  Those who remained behind or returned after the 
war, by contrast, generally encountered the full rigour of the Soviet penal system.”). 
 234. ETCHER, supra note 82, at 3, 16.  Etcher, in his January 1944 article, was also 
prescient in calling for the establishment of a “United Nations Criminal Court” to try the 
top Nazi leaders, and what would later become the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg: 
   We must decide to establish an United Nations Criminal Court for all cases 
which for territorial or moral reasons have acquired international importance.  
All the arch-criminals who have committed crimes in various countries or 
against humanity as a whole should be tried and punished by this court.  The 
legal basis for the jurisdiction of this court could be clearly established if the 
United Nations were to delegate jurisdiction to the court for those cases which 
had been enumerated in the convention establishing the court. 
Id. at 15.  In effect, in writing about the Kharkov trial, Etcher was sketching a blue-print 
for the IMT.  Etcher’s prescience also extended to calling for prosecution of the Nazi 
leaders for the crime of waging a war of aggression.  Echoing Justice Jackson’s later 
statements and the Judgment of the IMT, Etcher explained that jurisdiction of the United 
Nations Criminal Court should include foremost “the preparation of, and the launching 
of, this Second World War . . . .  This aggression was the fundamental crime.  Without war, 
there would be no ‘war crimes.’”  Id.; compare Robert H. Jackson, Report to the 
President by Mr. Justice Jackson, June 6, 1945, Int’l Conference on Military Trials 
(1949) (“It is high time that we act on the juridical principle that aggressive war-making 
is illegal and criminal”), with Judgment of the Int’l Military Tribunal, Nov. 20, 1945, The 
Trial of German Major War Criminals by the Int’l Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg 
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“[T]he real value of the Kharkov trial . . . lies in the early and convincing 
reassurance not merely that such cases will be prosecuted . . . but also 
that their trial in due form of law, with all the safeguards of the law’s 
regular machinery, is practicable and even simple.”235 
Legal scholars hail the Nuremberg proceedings as the beginning of the 
“judicialization of World War II atrocities in Europe”236 and “legalism’s 
greatest moment of glory.”237  In fact, the judicialization began with the 
Kharkov Trial, putting into practice the political decision made by 
Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin two months earlier to use the public 
courtroom as the setting where the deeds of both Nazi leaders and 
ordinary German foot soldiers would be examined.  Since the Nuremberg 
trials mark the birth of modern international criminal law, the Kharkov trial 
is the seed from which this policy arose, and exists today in the work of 
the International Criminal Court and the various ad hoc international 
criminal tribunals such as the Yugoslav and Rwandan war crimes tribunals. 
While the Kharkov trial was only briefly mentioned during the 
Nuremberg proceedings,238 a direct link between the two proceedings 
nevertheless exists.  Kharkov served to make the Germans, the Soviets, 
the British, the Americans, and the rest of the world aware that “war 
criminals” would not escape punishment for their criminal acts as many 
had done at the end of World War I,239 or that if punishment was meted 
 
Germany (1946) (“To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international 
crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it 
contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.”). 
However, Etcher’s desire to establish this Court “now . . . [as] the only fitting inter-Allied 
sequel . . . to the Kharkov tribunal,” ETCHER, supra note 82, at 15–16, did not come to pass.  
Eighteen months later his proposal did become reality when the Allies in London created 
the IMT. 
 235. D.N. Pritt, Foreword to ETCHER, supra note 82, at 2. 
 236. MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 48 (2007). 
 237. BASS, supra note 148, at 203. 
 238. Sixty-Fourth Day: Thursday, 21st February, 1946 (Part 6 of 8), in The Trial of 
German Major War Criminals: Volume 7: Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany 14th February to 
26th February, 1946, THE NIZKOR PROJECT, http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/imt/tgmwc/ 
tgmwc-07/tgmwc-07-64-06.shtml (last visited Jan. 28, 2012) (Lieutenant-General Raginsky 
states, “From the document presented by the Soviet Prosecution as Exhibit USSR 32, 
containing the sentence pronounced by the Military Tribunal of the 4th Ukrainian Front 
on 15-18 December, 1943, it is evident that the German fascist armies in Kharkov, in the 
Province of Kharkov, acting on the direct instructions of Hitler’s Government, burnt, 
plundered and destroyed the material and cultural treasures of the Soviet people.  These 
excerpts, your Honours, you will find on Page 359 in your document book.”). 
 239. After World War I, the Germans did not take action to prosecute war criminals 
for two and a half years, which led the Allies to step in and agree to “permit the trial of 
BAZYLER-KHARKOV (DO NOT DELETE) 10/24/2016  5:47 PM 
 
118 
out, it would be inside the courtroom.  Rather than adopting the option 
of merely summarily executing war criminals,240 the Kharkov trial set a 
precedent for the use of a trial proceeding to justly determine the guilt of 
the individuals to be charged.241 
 
some 900 of the most serious violators of the laws and customs of war by the German 
Supreme Court in Leipzig, under German law and German conceptions of justice.  Only 
12 offenders were actually tried.  Of these, but 6 minor officers were convicted” with 
minimal sentences of at most four years of imprisonment.  Gluek, supra note 76, at 706.  
American commentators recognized at the time (during World War II) that the Soviets 
aimed to demonstrate to their Western Allies that after the war ended trials of Nazis 
would indeed take place.  See, e.g., Kharkov Trials, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 1943, at 5 
(“[I]t may be Stalin’s way of notifying his allies they must keep their pledge about 
bringing ‘war criminals’ to trial and make certain that none of them is permitted to save 
himself by surrender.”); Retribution at Kharkov, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 20, 
1943, at 18 (“For war criminals who had counted on a repetition of history to save them 
from justice, Kharkov is a grim spectacle indeed.  It alters the usual concept of war-guilt 
trials which envisaged these as an exclusively postwar function. . . .  The Russians can 
remember as well as anyone the Allied promises to punish the criminals of World War One, 
the strange aftermath in which the German authorities and peoples joined in declaring that 
program of punishment to be merely a frenzy of hatred against Germany, and the sequel 
in which only the merest handful were convicted.”); Edwin L. James, Red Propaganda 
Coup Seen in Atrocity Trial: Kharkov Tribunal, Now Acting Under Moscow Decisions, 
Traces Cruelty Orders to Higher Nazis, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1943, at E3 (“Whether or 
not Secretary Hull and Foreign Secretary Eden expected the Russians to start trials right 
away is not on the record, but it is quite plain that the Russian leader interpreted the 
Moscow decision quite literally and has seized the earliest opportunity to carry it out.”). 
 240. At the Tehran Conference, November 28 to December 1, 1943, Stalin expressed his 
preference to take the top 50,000 Nazi officials and shoot them, a statement that so 
offended Churchill that he exclaimed that “Parliament and the British public would never 
countenance mass killings like that,” and then stormed out of the conference room in a 
fury.  KOCHAVI, supra note 23, at 402–03.  The Soviets later would support the view 
championed by American Secretary of War Henry Stimson to hold trials. BASS, supra 
note 148, at 148.  Churchill, however, was not opposed to summary executions, but only 
to the high number proposed by Stalin.  Id. at 189–90.  As late as April 12, 1945, the 
British War Cabinet, in support of Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s longtime view, 
continued to argue “that it would be preferable that the Nazi leaders should be declared 
world outlaws and summarily put to death as soon as they fell into Allied hands.”  Id. at 
190. 
It would be an overstatement, therefore, to say that the Kharkov trial firmly set the 
policy of the Allies to criminally prosecute Nazis through the use of international law 
and domestic legislation rather than to summarily execute them.  The final decision was 
always in flux, and it was not until the Allied legal representatives met in London in the 
summer of 1945 and promulgated the IMT Charter that one could be assured that the 
judicialization of Nazi atrocities would take place. 
 241. Michael J. Bazyler, The Role of the Soviet Union in the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg and Impact on Its Legacy, in DIE NÜRNBERGER PROZESSE: 
VÖLKERSTRAFRECHT SEIT 1945 [THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
SINCE 1945], at 45 (Herbert R. Reginbogin, Christoph J. Safferling & Walter R. Hippel 
eds., 2006) (“The nation first to announce their preference for a judicial process for the 
crimes of the Nazis was the Soviet Union. . . .  The British . . . were not keen on setting up a 
court to judge the Nazis . . . favor[ing] execution by firing squad of the major Nazi war 
criminals” like U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Morgethau Jr.’s “Morgenthau-Plan.”).  
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Kharkov also expanded the definition of “war criminals” to include 
not only those individuals who gave orders, but also those individuals who 
carried out orders, and confirmed that the defense of “following orders”— 
raised by the three German defendants regarding Nazi crimes—would 
not succeed.  Etcher, writing in 1944 before the Nuremberg trials were 
contemplated, explains: 
Here is the fifth lesson of the Kharkov trial.  In this first trial of German war 
criminals the Kharkov tribunal sentenced the accused in spite of their plea of 
superior orders and in accordance with Soviet penal law, with the criminal codes of 
almost all the United Nations, with the German military Code of October 10, 1940 
(Article 47), with the opinion of nearly all experts in International Law and in 
accordance with the standpoint which the London International Assembly adopted 
on May 4th, 1943.242 
 
Additionally, Hirsch notes that “[t]he Soviets pushed for and agreed to participate in 
an international tribunal of major Nazi leaders (this time present and accounted for) for 
the sake of catharsis, and with the faith that a public trial and conviction of ‘the 
Hitlerites’ would serve positive political goals—demonstrating the evils of fascism and 
the valor of the people-loving Soviet people.”  Hirsch, supra note 190, at 714.   
An editorial in the New York Times written in the immediate aftermath of the Kharkov 
trial argued for the importance of holding war crimes trials: 
   The execution of any man whose guilt is not clearly established would make 
that man a martyr.  It may be difficult now to imagine any large section of the 
German people as possessing a sense of justice.  Yet in the end they, too, must 
come to see that the killing of hostages, the murders, slow or swift, committed 
in the internment camps, the horrors of the lethal chamber, the almost inconceivable 
savagery which not only wiped out the innocent people of Lidice but boasted it, 
were not merely crimes against those who died but crimes against all 
humanity—even German humanity.  They will see this sooner and with better 
effect on the peace of the world if every offender, from private to general, from 
slinking spy to arrogant Gestapo official, has his day in court.  
Shadows in a Market Place, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1943, at 26. 
 242. ETCHER, supra note 82, at 11.  The London International Assembly was an 
unofficial body created in 1941 to deal with issues of international criminal law, with 
Allied governments appointing representatives.  It was one of the first bodies calling for 
the establishment of a permanent International Criminal Court, to be created after the end 
of the war.  On May 4, 1943, it agreed to the following: 
   An order given by a superior to an inferior to commit a crime is not itself a 
defence.  The court may consider in individual cases whether the accused was 
placed in a state of irresistible compulsion and acquit him or mitigate the 
punishment accordingly.  The defence that the accused was placed in a state of 
compulsion is excluded: (a) if the crime was of a revolting nature[;] (b) if the 
accused at the time when the alleged crime was committed was a member of 
an organisation the membership of which implied the duty to execute criminal 
orders. 
Id. at 10–11. 
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The drafters of the Nuremberg Charter specifically legislated in June 
1945 what had already been announced as judicial precedent at Kharkov 
in December 1943.  Article 8 of the Nuremberg Charter set out the 
following principle with regard to the prosecution of the German Major 
War Criminals: “The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of 
his Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, 
but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal 
determines that justice so requires.”243  At the same time, the Kharkov 
trial “chase[d] the guilt as high up as [it] could,” in order to establish the 
guilt of major war criminals who would later be charged under a  “criminal 
organization” theory at the Nuremberg Tribunal.244 
There is one major difference, however, between Kharkov and 
Nuremberg.  Much to the Soviets’ dismay, the Nuremberg tribunal did 
not proceed as a “show trial” quite to the same extent that the Kharkov 
trial had.245  As Francine Hirsch describes, the Soviets were unable to 
control “‘the script’—the course of the trials or the narrative that the 
trials told—despite their best efforts to do so.”246  However, she adds that 
 
 243. Nuremberg Charter art. 8 (1945). 
 244. James, supra note 239, at E3. James explained that “[t]he excuses of the 
Germans on trial there run along the line that they were military men carrying out orders.  
There is no evidence that the court discourages this line; indeed, there is an apparent 
design to put on the record in full this plea of the accused Germans.  In other words, the 
Russians intend to chase the guilt as high up as they can. . . .  What the Russians intend 
to do, in all probability, is to try to chase blame officially right on up to Himmler and 
then to Hitler.  They haven’t got their hands on the arch-culprits, but perhaps they may 
some day.” Id.; see also Bazyler, supra note 241, at 46 (“The Soviets maintained that the 
IMT should focus on the leaders and members of the Nazi organizations, with the 
authority to rule after each case whether the entire organization—for example, the 
Gestapo—constituted a criminal enterprise.  This procedural move would thereby ‘eliminat[e] 
the need to prove the criminality of the organization in each subsequent case of prosecution of 
a member of the organization.’  In the end, the Soviet position prevailed, and became an 
important prosecutorial tool during the [Nuremberg] trial.” (quoting GINSBURGS, supra 
note 184, at 98)); Hirsch, supra note 190, at 709–10 (“At the London Conference [in 
1945], the Four Powers also decided to integrate the complicity charge into the Nuremberg 
Charter, agreeing that ‘leaders, organizers, instigators, and accomplices participating in 
the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit’ specified 
crimes ‘are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan.’ . . .  
The exact degree to which the Soviets, versus the other members of the Four Powers, 
were responsible for the formulation of the charges in the Nuremberg Charter remains 
unknown.  What is clear is that historians who credit the United States with coming up 
with the major legal innovations of the Nuremberg Trials far overstate their case.”). 
 245. Hirsch, supra note 190, at 703 (“The Russian archival record leaves no question 
that the Soviet regime and its secret Commission for Directing the Nuremberg Trials 
envisioned Nuremberg as a ‘show trial’—that is, as an exercise in didactic legalism—and 
made a significant effort to control the Soviet legal team and the course of the trials.”). 
 246. Id. at 715 (“The Vyshinskii Commission, operating from Moscow before and 
during the ten months of the trials (and unable to establish a private Moscow-Nuremberg 
phone line), experienced great difficulties in its efforts to ‘direct’ the trials and to 
manage Soviet personnel on the ground.”).  “The final reminder to the Soviets that they 
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“Soviet leaders were willing to compromise on procedural issues as long 
as Nuremberg told a straightforward tale of good versus evil—as long as 
the Allies agreed from the start that the ‘Hitlerites alone’ (the Germans 
and the other Axis powers) would be treated as villains.”247  For the 
aforementioned reasons, the Kharkov trial, as stated by George Ginsburgs, 
“point[ed] the way toward the grand finale at Nuremberg.”248 
 B. Implications on Post-World War II Trials in the Soviet Union 
After the Kharkov trial and concurrently with the Nuremberg trials, 
between December 1945 and February 1946, the Soviet Union once again 
began publicly trying war criminals.  Alexander Prusin explains: 
In December 1945, two years after the Khar’kov trial, public trial began in 
Smolensk, where ten low-ranking members of the German army faced war crimes 
charges.  The trial was followed by a series of similar proceedings in the cities 
of Briansk, Leningrad, Velikie Luki, Riga, Minsk, Kiev, and Nikoloyav.  As in 
the Krasnodar and Khar’kov cases, the trials were held to pursue political and 
 
could not control the storyline of Nuremberg—and the biggest affront to their vision of 
what Nuremberg should be—came in October 1946 with the verdict.  Much to the Soviets’ 
dismay, three of the twenty-two major German war criminals standing trial . . . were found 
‘not guilty’ on the grounds of ‘reasonable doubt.’”  Id. at 726. 
 247. Id. at 717; Unfortunately for the Soviets, this wish was never granted.  As 
explained by Francine Hirsch, “the Soviets were failing to take advantage of this unique 
international setting to present the Soviet Union to the world in the best possible light.”  
Id. at 723. 
The Soviet correspondents did not have adequate knowledge of what concurrently 
took place in the Soviet Union while they were in Nuremberg.  Additionally, unlike the 
Americans, the Soviets did not take advantage of the ability to screen films of their 
representatives to the international press and also battled the spread of negative rumors 
by the United States about the Soviet Union in both Nuremberg and other American 
zones.  Id.  While the Soviets attempted to remedy this problem, the Soviet Union was 
still never able to put itself in a better light before the international audience.  Id. at 724. 
The Germans were also allowed to present defenses that accused the Soviet Union of 
having been prepared to fight alongside the Germans in 1939.  Although these accusations 
were true, “the British and the Americans had gone back on their word and had helped the 
German defense to turn Nuremberg into a forum for attacking the USSR . . . .  Unprepared 
for the defense’s attack, and expecting their wartime allies to prevent items on the list of 
hot-button issues from being discussed in open court, [the Soviet] team had let their 
guard down, allowing the defense to denigrate the USSR before the whole world.”  Id. at 
724–25.  The Soviet response was to send more advisors to Nuremberg.  “But the damage 
could not be undone: the Western powers, in allowing the German defense to present 
evidence that incriminated the Soviets in crimes against peace, had distanced themselves 
from the USSR and undermined Soviet efforts to use the trials to present an unambiguous 
narrative of good versus evil.”  Id. at 725–26. 
 248. Bazyler, supra note 241, at 48 (quoting GINSBURGS, supra note 184, at 56). 
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ideological objectives.  The timing of the trials was chosen carefully to correspond 
with the Nuremberg Military Tribunal.249 
These trials featured similar war crimes and crimes against humanity 
charges as well as “crimes against civilians and POWs, and the destruction 
of property” charges, to those found at Nuremberg.250  The dockets would 
contain more than eighty defendants of different German military rank 
and used the idea of collective responsibility—akin to the conspiracy 
charge at Nuremberg—to infer guilt.251  In total, the Soviets convicted at 
least 25,921 German and Austrian Nazis after the war in the Soviet 
Union.252  Additionally, over one million German POWs in the Soviet 
 
 249. Prusin, supra note 29, at 7; GINSBURGS, supra note 184, at 56 n.33 (“Immediately 
after the close of World War II, the policy and techniques first tested at Kharkov were 
resumed on a large scale by the Soviet government.  A series of public trials was conducted 
at various locations.  Death sentences were liberally meted out.  Ten Germans were tried 
in Smolensk for wholesale atrocities against Soviet civilians and war prisoners; seven were 
hanged, one sentenced to 20 years at hard labor, one to 15 years and one to 12 . . . .  
Eleven Germans, including a Major-General, were tried at Leningrad with a defence 
counsel of German lawyers: the General and seven others were sentenced to hang, two 
received twenty years at hard labor, one 15 years . . . .  At Briansk, three, including a 
Lieutenant-General, were sentenced to hang, one received twenty years of imprisonment. . . .  
Seven Germans were convicted of war crimes and executed at Riga . . . .”). 
 250. Prusin, supra note 29, at 8. 
 251. Id. 
 252. See Andreas Hilger, Die Gerechtigkeit nehme ihren Lauf!: die Reden des 
sowjetischen Hauptanklägers im Nürnberger Prozess der deutschen Hauptkriegsverbrecher 
[The Justice Takes Its Course: the Speeches of the Soviet Chief Prosecutor at the Nuremberg 
Trials of German Major War Criminals], in TRANSNATIONALE VERGANGENHEITSPOLITIK 
[TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE PAST] 193 tbl.1 (2006) (translation by authors).  
Additionally, there were twenty-one major trials of war criminals in the Soviet Union 
between 1961 and 1965, as indicated in “Post War Adjudication of War Crimes Fact 
Sheet,” compiled by the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (unpublished, and 
on file with authors).  Lukasz Hirszowicz explains the trials in the USSR after the 1940s: 
   The media also paid attention to war crimes trials held in the USSR . . . .  
Before 1960, with the notable exception of trials of well-known collaborators 
with the enemy in the immediate postwar years, there was little if any reporting 
in the accessible media of such trials held in the USSR.  But there is every 
reason to believe that under Stalin many people who had had any contacts with 
the occupiers, including war criminals and participants in the Holocaust, were 
prosecuted and sentenced, and that there were such trials after 1953 as well.  I 
came across reports of depositions by people accused of war crimes in 1949 
and 1959 . . . and a report of a war crimes trial in 1957, the latter without any 
Jewish connotations . . . .  The amnesty decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 
17 September 1955 “for Soviet citizens who collaborated with occupiers 
during the Great Patriotic War, 1941–45” should be mentioned in this context.  
The amnesty applied to a very wide group of offenders, with the explicit 
exception of individuals guilty of murder and torture of Soviet citizens . . . .  
The amnesty must have signified a certain relaxation with regard to people 
under the cloud of accusations of collaborating and sympathizing with the enemy.  
Hence, the reasons for the lack, or the extreme paucity, of reports about war 
crime trials must have been complex, and the unwillingness to bring the fate of 
the Jewish population to general attention could have been only one of them. 
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Union and other parts of Eastern Europe were used as laborers to rebuild 
the destruction that resulted from the war.253  Many of these men were 
not returned to Germany until many years after the war ended.254 
 
   After 1960 we find in the media a considerable number of reports of war 
crimes trials in the USSR, in the Baltic republics, in Ukraine, and Belorussia, 
as well as in the RSFSR.  In the course of the trials the Nazi crimes against the 
Jewish population were discussed, in most cases in the same way as described 
above with regard to trials held abroad.  Naturally, there are no attacks on the 
leniency of the courts or on the way the trial is conducted. 
   The more important trials were reported at greater length in the press of the 
republic where the trial was held, and there was also reporting in the central 
press, though less frequent and shorter.  We know very little about the way of 
reporting trials in the local press. 
Hirszowicz, supra note 201, at 39–40.  Additionally, the Soviets 
accused the German courts of not being aggressive enough in pursuing big-
time Nazis.  At the same time, they complained that the German courts had 
missed the point of Order No. 201 on denazification, which drew a clear 
distinction between nominal Nazis, who were needed for the democratic 
construction of the country and therefore should quickly be given back their 
political and civil rights, and former active Nazis, militarists and war criminals, 
who should immediately be brought to justice.  When the German system dallied, 
the Soviets sometimes simply lost patience, took over the trials, and punished 
the alleged offenders. 
NAIMARK, supra note 5, at 66.  This last point is interesting because it shows that German 
courts in the Soviet zone exercised some independence from their Soviet masters.  This 
independence was soon lost in 1949 with the creation of the German Democratic Republic, 
which became a puppet state of the Soviet Union.  Trials by Germans in the occupied 
zone of Germany are outside of the scope of this article. 
 253. RICHARD BESSEL, GERMANY 1945: FROM WAR TO PEACE 202–03, 251 (2009). 
“The destruction left in the wake of German occupation led the victorious Allies to put 
German POWs to work rebuilding cities and towns across Europe, both east and west.  
In particular, the USSR looked upon the enemy troops they had taken prisoner as a 
source of labour, and between December 1944 and August 1945 the number of ‘western’ 
prisoners of war (the majority of whom were Germans) registered as working for the 
Russians grew from 418,979 to 1,623,137.  Many would spend years in captivity, in 
camps in the USSR or rebuilding destroyed cities and towns in the Soviet Union.  
Altogether, the German soldiers of the Second World War would spend more man-years 
in captivity than they had in active service.”  Id. at 251.  “Although the British and 
French also used German POW labour for reconstruction work back home, it was in the 
USSR that POW labour was used most extensively and for the longest time.  Whereas all 
the Germans taken prisoner in the west had been released by the end of 1948, it would 
not be until 1955 that the last surviving German POWs returned from the USSR.”  Id. at 
203.  Hundreds of thousands of these German POWs died while in captivity. 
 254. Id. 
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C. The Formation of Holocaust Memory in the Soviet Union and 
Contribution of Nazi Trials in the U.S.S.R. to                                          
Holocaust Memory 
During the war, there was no specific term used to describe the mass 
murders and other atrocities committed against the Jews of Europe.255  
This was true in the United States and Western and Central Europe, as well 
as in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.  For the first twenty years 
after the defeat of Nazi Germany, little attention was paid to murder of the 
Jews, and the term “Holocaust” as representative of the destruction of 
the Jews in Europe was unknown.256  In 1948, with the creation of Israel, 
the Israeli Declaration of Independence referred to the period as “the 
Nazi shoa,”257 which was translated officially into English as “the 
Nazi holocaust” at the end of the 1950s.258  In the West, the word 
“holocaust”—used in various contexts prior to the war to describe some 
kind of tragedy, natural or man-made—began to be used in the 
American public discourse in the 1960s to refer to the special tragedy of 
the Jews at the hands of the Nazis and their collaborators.259  However, it 
was only after the Eichmann trial in 1961–62 that references to the period 
during World War II as “the Holocaust”260 (capitalized “H”) became more 
common.261 
 
 255. PETER NOVICK, THE HOLOCAUST IN AMERICAN LIFE 20 (1999) (“[D]uring the 
war, and for some time thereafter, there was no agreed-upon word for the murder of 
Europe’s Jews . . . .”). 
 256. Id. at 1–2.  It would be an overstatement to say that the murder of the six 
million Jews was quickly forgotten after the war.  For a recent volume challenging this 
“myth of silence” that supposedly took place until the 1960s, see AFTER THE HOLOCAUST: 
CHALLENGING THE MYTH OF SILENCE (Eric J. Sundquist & David Cesarani eds., 2011). 
 257. NOVICK, supra note 255, at 133 (“‘[S]hoah,’ in the Hebrew Bible, was repeatedly 
used to describe punishments visited by God on the Jews.”). 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. (“‘Holocaust’ began to be widely used in connection with the Nazi murder 
program in the 1960s.”).  For an excellent discussion of the etymology of the term and its 
various meanings, see John Petrie, The Secular Word HOLOCAUST: Scholarly Myths, 
History, and 20th Century Meanings, 2 J. GENOCIDE RES. 31, 31–63 (2000), available at 
http://www.armenews.com/IMG/pdf/petrie_the_secular_word_holocaust.pdf. 
 260. The United States Holocaust Museum explains that “[t]he word holocaust 
comes from the ancient Greek, olos meaning ‘whole’ and kaustos or kautos 
meaning ‘burnt.” Frequently Asked Questions . . . About the Holocaust, U.S. HOLOCAUST 
MEMORIAL MUSEUM, http://www.ushmm.org/research/library/faq/details.php?topic=01#02 
(last visited on Oct. 25, 2012).  Initially, the term was not used to exclusively refer to the 
murder of Jews, but instead to the Nazi crimes generally. 
 261. NOVICK, supra note 255, at 133 (“‘Holocaust’ began to be widely used . . . not 
as the result of a gentile plot, but as an import from Israel.”).  American journalists at the 
Eichmann trial used the term “Holocaust” as a translation for “shoah,” as Israelis had 
done for many years.  The first time the translation appears is in the 1948 Israeli 
Declaration of Independence official Israeli English translation of “the Nazi shoa” as 
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 In the late 1970s, the topic of “the Holocaust” became “ever  more 
central in American public discourse—particularly among Jews, but also 
in the culture at large.”262  A greater recognition of the Jewish tragedy also 
began to take place in Western Europe.  Popular media helped the formation 
of Holocaust memory in the West.  In April 1978, NBC presented 
Holocaust,263 a miniseries, that had over 100 million American viewers 
and conveyed more information to the American public over the course 
of its four-night showing than had been imparted during the prior thirty 
years.264  Holocaust was also shown in Germany in January 1979.265  As 
Peter Novick points out, “[t]he airing of the series . . . became a turning 
point in Germany’s long-delayed confrontation with the Holocaust, which, 
albeit not without bumps in the road, has continued ever since.  It enabled 
Germans to connect with Jewish victims, and with the crime, as never 
before.”266  Other Holocaust-themed television shows were released around 
the same time, including Playing for Time, Escape from Sobibor, Triumph 
of the Spirit, and War and Remembrance.267 
At the same time, Jewish organizations were working to educate both 
Jewish and non-Jewish Americans about the Holocaust.268  Then, in 1979, 
President Carter, in an Executive Order, created the United States 
Holocaust Memorial Council.  The Council “defined ‘the Holocaust’ as 
 
“the Nazi holocaust.” Id.  “In the United States, the word ‘Holocaust’ first became firmly 
attached to the murder of European Jewry as a result of the trial [of Eichmann].” Id.   
During the war, in the United States, most people did not know about the atrocities 
taking place in Europe and the Soviet Union against the Jewish population.  News 
correspondents were afraid that their accounts would be viewed as exaggerations and not 
credible. Id. at 22–23.  For example, a New York Times correspondent who traveled with 
the Red Army, while explaining that the “Soviet officials claimed that tens of thousands 
of Jews had been killed at Babi Yar, ‘no witnesses to the shooting . . . talked with the 
correspondents’; ‘it is impossible for this correspondent to judge the truth or falsity of 
the story told to us’; ‘there is little evidence in the ravine to prove or disprove the story.’” 
Id. at 22. 
 262. Id. at 1–2. 
 263. Id. at 209 (“The drama followed ten years in the lives of two fictional 
families—one of assimilated German Jews, the other of a highly placed official of the 
SS . . . .  [T]he series was able to cover all of the principal landmarks: the Nuremberg 
Laws, Kristallnacht, the Wannsee Conference, Babi Yar, the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising; 
Buchewald, Theresienstadt, and Aushwitz.”). 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. at 213. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. at 210 (“Jewish organizations successfully lobbied major newspapers to . . . 
publish special inserts on the Holocaust.”). 
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the ‘. . . extermination of six million Jews and some five million other 
peoples . . . .’”269 
In the Soviet Union, immediately after the war, discussion of the mass 
murder of Soviet Jews during Nazi occupation was repressed, as it had 
been during the war.270  According to Zvi Gitelman, as of 1997, “the 
term ‘Holocaust’ [was] completely unknown in the Soviet literature.  In 
discussions of the destruction of the Jews, the terms ‘annihilation’ 
(unichtozhenie) or ‘catastrophe’ (katastrofa) [had] been used.”271 
Gitelman provides a leading rationale behind the official Soviet policy 
of treating the suffering of all nationalities and ethnic groups in the 
Soviet Union under Nazi occupation equally, encapsulated in the above-
noted Soviet slogan “Do Not Divide the Dead”: 
[N]o country in the West lost as many of its non-Jewish citizens in the war 
against Nazism as did the USSR, so that the fate of the Jews in France, Holland, 
Germany, or Belgium stands in sharper contrast to that of their co-nationals or 
co-religionist than it does in the East . . . .  Thus the Soviet Union did treat the issue 
differently from the way it was treated in most other countries, whether socialist 
or not, though the Soviet treatment was not uniform . . . .  [T]he Holocaust was 
seen as an integral part of a larger phenomenon—the murder of civilians—
whether Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, Gypsies, or other nationalities.  It 
was said to be a natural consequence of racist fascism . . . .  If the Nazis gave the 
Jews “special treatment,” the Soviets would not.272 
With respect to discussion of the Holocaust of Ukrainian Jews, Dawson 
explains: “It’s been said that history is written by the winners, but in the 
history of the Holocaust it’s as though the chapter on Ukraine had been 
written by Himmler himself.  For all practical purposes, the pages are 
blank.”273  Dawson reflects: 
The slaughter by gunfire in Ukraine should have become Hitler’s original sin and 
Babi Yar—where 34,000 Jews were murdered in two days—the darkest icon of 
the Shoah.  But when the war ended, Stalin abetted Himmler’s cover-up by 
 
 269. Petrie, supra note 259, at 49. 
 270. Paul A. Shapiro, Foreword to PATRICK DESBOIS, THE HOLOCAUST BY BULLETS: 
A PRIEST’S JOURNEY TO UNCOVER THE TRUTH BEHIND THE MURDER OF 1.5 MILLION JEWS 
viii (2008) (“These first mass victims of the Holocaust went largely forgotten through 
most of the post-World War II era.  Their stories and the fates of their communities were 
obscured by clouds of Soviet secrecy and anti-Semitism.  While we [the West] slowly 
but surely came to understand the detailed operation of the Nazi concentration camp system 
in the west, Soviet totalitarianism restricted our knowledge about the east.”); Zvi Gitelman, 
Politics and the Historiography of the Holocaust in the Soviet Union, in BITTER LEGACY: 
CONFRONTING THE HOLOCAUST IN THE USSR 21 (Zvi Gitelman ed., 1997) (“Even during 
the war (1944), the Soviet Extraordinary State Commission to Examine and Investigate 
German-Fascist Crimes was ‘instructed to avoid stating that the victims of the massacres 
had been Jews’ and ‘to suppress the extent of Ukrainian collaboration with the Germans 
and particularly with the SS in the mass shootings of Jews.’”). 
 271. Gitelman, supra note 270, at 18–19. 
 272. Id. at 18, 20. 
 273. DAWSON, supra note 30, at 7. 
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throwing an Iron Curtain around his crime scene, off limits to writers, journalists, 
and historians.  The only deaths in the great war to defend the Motherland would be 
“Russian” deaths.  And so, by default, the liberation of Auschwitz and other 
camps became the defining images of the Holocaust.  Hitler’s crime in Ukraine 
began to fade slowly from public view and consciousness till it became what it 
is today—barely a footnote in popular understanding of the Holocaust.274 
Anti-Semitism also played a role in the suppression of the special 
tragedy of the Jews during the Nazi occupation.  From 1948 until Stalin’s 
death in 1953, anti-Semitic policies escalated in the Soviet Union under 
the rubric of eradicating so-called “rootless cosmopolitanism.”275  As 
one commentator explains: “Suddenly, all Jews were potential traitors, 
enemies of the Soviet state, spies in the service of American and British 
Intelligence . . . [and] by August 12, 1952 virtually all of the members of 
[wartime Stalin-created] JAC [Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee] had been 
arrested or shot.”276 
Just before his death in January 1953, Stalin ordered the trial of nine 
doctors (at least six of whom were Jewish) charged with seeking to poison 
 
 274. Id. at 8. 
 275. Mordechai Altshuler, Jewish Holocaust Commemoration Activity in the USSR 
Under Stalin, Shoah Resource Center, 30 YAD VASHEM STUD. 271, 285 (Naftali 
Greenwood trans., 2002), available at http://www1.yadvashem.org/untoldstories/documents/ 
studies/Mordechai_Altshuler.pdf; Konstantin Azadovskii & Boris Egorov, From Anti-
Westernism to Anti-Semitism, 4 J. COLD WAR STUD. 66, 66–80 (Winter 2002), available 
at http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~hpcws/egorov.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2012) (“In private 
conversations he [Stalin] openly expressed his desire to eliminate ‘Jewish influence’ and 
to help a ‘native’ (i.e. non-Jewish) intelligentsia gain sway in the Soviet Union. . . .  
Terms such as rootless cosmopolitans, bourgeois cosmopolitans, and individuals devoid of 
nation or tribe continually appeared in newspaper articles.  All of these were code words 
for Jews and were understood as such by people at the time.”).  Anti-Semitism had been 
suppressed in the early after war years of 1945–1948, so that Joseph Stalin could be 
viewed as the Jewish savior. Miguel A. Faria, Jr., The Jewish Doctors’ Plot—The 
Aborted Holocaust in Stalin’s Russia!, HACIENDAPUBLISHING.COM (Aug. 3, 2011), http:// 
haciendapublishing.com/articles/jewish-doctors’-plot—aborted-holocaust-stalin’s-
russia (last visited Oct. 25, 2012).  In 1948, Russian Jews appeared “too festive, too 
enthusiastic,” at the visit of the Soviet Union by Golda Meir (the Israeli Prime Minister), 
that the Jewish people were viewed as a threat to the Soviet state, by Stalin. Id.  For more 
information on postwar anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union, see Antonella Salmoni, State-
Sponsored Anti-Semitism in Postwar USSR: Studies and Research Perspectives , J. 
FONDAZIONE CDEC (Apr. 2010), http://www.quest-cdecjournal.it/files/5_ Salomoni.pdf. 
 276. Faria, supra note 275.  Additionally, Antonella Salmoni describes “this time 
embedded in a specific anti-Jewish campaign and the repressions set out by the Stalinist 
regime; this period of violence allowed the return of abuses and the revitalisation of 
stereotypes of anti-Jewish flavor.” Salmoni, supra note 275, at 79. 
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Soviet leaders, to “resolve the Soviet Union’s Jewish problem.”277  Shortly 
after Stalin’s death in March 1953, it was discovered that the confessions 
had been coerced and thus fabricated.278  It began to appear as though 
the complete annihilation of the Jewish people that the Nazis sought was 
actually occurring, both in actuality and in lack of discussion.279 
Albeit seemingly small, some effort was made after the war by Soviet 
Jews themselves to bring to light the suffering of the Jewish people at the 
hands of the Germans and local collaborators.  In 1946, Soviet Jewish 
writers Ilya Ehrenberg and Vassily Grossman280 published the Black 
Book281 in the United States and other foreign countries.282  The book 
became the “best source of primary material on the Holocaust in the 
Soviet Union,” but was banned from publication.283  The Black Book 
was rejected for publication because, in the eyes of Soviet officials, it 
emphasized, “the Germans murdered and plundered Jews only.  The 
reader unwittingly gets the impression that the Germans fought against 
the USSR for the sole purpose of destroying Jews.”284  The volume only 
appeared in Russia and the other former Soviet states in 1993, after the 
breakup of the Soviet Union.285 
Despite attempts by Soviet officials to restrict the memory of the 
atrocities committed against the Jews during the war, Soviet Jews did 
attempt to commemorate their special suffering.286  Mordechai Altshuler 
explains: 
 
 277. A. Mark Clarfield, The Soviet ‘Doctor’s Plot’—50 Years On, 325 BRIT. MED. J. 
1487, 1487–88 (2002); HELEN RAPPAPORT, JOSEPH STALIN: A BIOGRAPHICAL COMPANION 
261 (1999). 
 278. Clarfield, supra note 277, at 1487. 
 279. Shapiro, supra note 270, at ix. 
 280. Zvi Gitelman explains that Grossman objected to the repeated use of the term 
“Jew” because it was simply too frequent, but Ehrenburg insisted that it was unavoidable 
to use the word. Gitelman, supra note 270, at 14, 19. 
 281. Salmoni, supra note 275, at 75–76 (“The only great work of documentation in 
the Soviet era occurred during the war, when a Black Book was compiled in real time in 
order to record a sizeable selection of witnesses to the genocide.  It is known that the 
volume was stopped by censorship in 1947, at the time of the disestablishment of the 
Jewish Antifascist Committee (EAK), which had promoted the work, and the beginning 
of the most acute stage of the campaign against the so-called ‘nationalism’, ‘cosmopolitism’ 
and ‘Zionism’ of the Soviet Jewry.  That is the reason why the integral publication of 
this collection in 1993 was perceived as a turning point in research.”). 
 282. David M. Crowe, The Holocaust, Historiography, and History, in TEACHING 
AND STUDYING THE HOLOCAUST 24, 47 (Samuel Totten & Stephen Feinberg eds., 2001). 
 283. Id. 
 284. Gitelman, supra note 270, at 14, 19 (quoting G. Alexandrov, the head of the 
Party Secretariat’s Agitprop department in the USSR, in 1947). 
 285. Id. 
 286. Altshuler, supra note 275, at 4.  Communities in the Soviet Union wanted to 
commemorate the Jews who had been murdered, but it was forbidden.  See id.  In July 
1944, the town of Cherven was liberated by the Red Army and the Jewish families who 
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Soviet Jewry, like Jewish communities in most East European countries, fervently 
wished to memorialize the victims of the Holocaust.  Soviet Jews acted intensively 
for years, even during Stalin’s last days, to make this possible.  Although the 
commemorative effort was conducted by the religious community administration 
or by people associated with it, it embraced very broad strata in Jewish society.287 
One of the first gatherings to commemorate Holocaust victims took 
place in Kharkov in January 1945 to mark the anniversary of the Drobitsky 
Yar massacre.288  The Drobitsky Yar commemoration was an exception.  
Public commemoratory gatherings and burials were forbidden, though 
“appropriate institutions” such as synagogues were able to hold memorial 
services.289  According to Altshuler: “[There is] evidence of extensive 
Jewish activity in the commemoration of Holocaust victims.  Jews from 
various towns participated in these efforts, and religious circles and 
prominent figures in the Soviet establishment maintained cooperative 
relations in their joint endeavors.”290  This commemoration continued even 
after it was forbidden.291  Unlike in other European nations, where 
commemoration was allowed, Soviet Jews had to make “strenuous efforts” 
and “maneuver among various Soviet authorities in order to implement, 
albeit partly and often unsuccessfully, even a few of their plans in this 
respect.”292  Altshuler points out that “[t]his alone illustrates the vast 
importance that these Jews attributed to Holocaust commemoration.”293 
Finally, in 1991, with the fall of the Soviet Union, discussion of “the 
Holocaust” and access to the massive Soviet archives were finally 
allowed.294  Ukraine gained with its independence the ability to discuss 
 
returned wanted to create a monument for the Jews who had been murdered there. See id. 
at 9–10.  They began to collect donations and information, but soon ran out of funding 
and were never able to complete the memorial.  See id. at 10–11. 
 287. Id. at 21. 
 288. See id. at 4.  The gathering raised approximately 15,000 rubles.  Id. 
 289. See id. at 5–6.  In 1946, “many synagogues across the Soviet Union, including 
the Great Synagogue in Moscow, held memorial services for Holocaust victims.”  Id. at 7. 
 290. Id. at 11. 
 291. See id. at 13–14. 
 292. Id. at 21. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Shapiro, supra note 270, at ix–x (“After the disintegration of the U.S.S.R., the 
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum undertook an intensive effort to microfilm 
Holocaust-related documents in archival repositories of the newly independent former 
Soviet republics.  The collections were much more voluminous [over five million pages 
and counting] than anticipated, including, for example, the records of the ‘Extraordinary 
State Commission to Investigate German-Fascist Crimes Committed on Soviet Territory’ 
. . . and massive collections of war crimes trials relating to the Holocaust from former 
KGB archives.”); Crowe, supra note 282, at 47 (“With the collapse of the Soviet Union 
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the Holocaust and to refer to the victims of the Holocaust as “Jews” in 
the monument for Babi Yar.295  The monument had not even been 
constructed until 1976, well after Yevtushenko’s “Babi Yar” poem brought 
the world’s attention to the massacre, which contained the opening 
words “No monument stands over Babi Yar.”296  In 1996, the Kharkov 
Holocaust Museum, the first Holocaust museum in the Ukraine, opened.297  
Gitelman adds: “It is only recently [as of 1997] that ‘Holocaust,’ 
transliterated from English [as ‘Golocaust’]” appears in the public  
vocabulary.298 
We noted above how the plaque installed in 2000 at the Kharkov 
Theater referencing the trial makes no mention of Jews as victims.  
However, in 2002, a memorial was dedicated in the presence of Ukraine’s 
president, Leonid Kuchma, at Drobitsky Yar.  A nine-foot-tall menorah 
stands beside the highway at Drobitsky Yar: 
To one side, a tree-lined road winds to a massive white arch with the years 
“1941–1942” framed in a circle on the outside and bright blue Stars of David 
within.  Below the arch is a sculpture depicting the tablets of the Ten 
Commandments.  “Thou Shall Not Kill” engraved in several languages, including 
Yiddish and Ukrainian.299 
In 2005, the United Nations passed a resolution designating January 
27 as International Holocaust Remembrance Day (Yom Hashoa), devoted 
 
in 1991, a new body of historical writing on the Holocaust by former Soviet historians 
began to appear.  Two important historiographical studies on Soviet perspectives on the 
Holocaust that surfaced during this period were Zvi Gitelman’s ‘Soviet Reaction to the 
Holocaust, 1945-1991’ (1993), and his ‘Politics and the Historiography of the Holocaust 
in the Soviet Union’ (1997).  These pioneering works opened the door for future study of 
the historiography of the Holocaust during the Soviet era.  Gitelman (1997) argues that 
the uneven application of the policy of Holocaust suppression left a distorted view of this 
tragedy that has proven very difficult to overcome in the post-Soviet era. . . .”); Gitelman, 
supra note 270, at 14, 15 (“In 1991 and 1992 . . . in Ukraine and Russia, articles began to 
appear in non-Jewish journals that described the Holocaust and raised some of the 
sensitive issues of complicity by local populations, Soviet suppression of discussion of 
the Holocaust, and the impact of the Holocaust on Jewish perceptions.”). 
 295. Gitelman, supra note 270, at 14, 20; Olena Ivanova, Constructing a Collective 
Memory of the Holocaust and National Identity of the Student Youth in Ukraine, Address at 
the Third Annual Danyliw Research Seminar on Contemporary Ukraine (Oct. 13, 2007) 
(“The first President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk’s acknowledgment of a partial guilt of 
Ukrainians in the destruction of Jews during World War II became a turning point in 
constructing a new official memory about the Holocaust.”). 
 296. Avi Hoffman, A Museum for Babi Yar, JERUSALEM POST (Oct. 23, 2011), 
http://www.jpost.com/JerusalemReport/JewishWorld/Article.aspx?id=242635; Gitelman, 
supra note 270, at 14, 20 (“The poem was a sensation because it condemned anti-
Semitism and made it clear that Soviet society was not free of that problem.”). 
 297. Gitelman, supra note 270, at 14, 18–19. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Vladimir Matveyev, Gas, Bathroom, and Shoah Memorial: Proposed Construction 
Causes Uproar, UJC FEDWEB: WORLD JEWRY, http://central.ujcfedweb.org/page.aspx?id= 
54766 (last visited Oct. 25, 2012). 
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for annual commemoration of the victims of the Nazis and coinciding 
with the day that Auschwitz was liberated by Soviet troops.300  As of this 
writing, International Holocaust Remembrance Day is recognized in 
Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.301 
In light of the suppression of Holocaust history and memory in the 
Soviet Union, the postwar trials of Germans in the Soviet Union played 
only a small, though not insignificant, role in the development of such 
history and memory.  As noted above, after the war, the Soviets held a 
number of trials of captured Germans in various Soviet cities.  As in the 
Kharkov trial, a large proportion of the unnamed victims were Jews.302 
However, at these trials and in the account of them by the Soviet 
press, the murdered Jews were again most often referred to as “Soviet 
citizens,” as they had been in the Kharkov trial.303  Nevertheless, as Prusin 
observes, “the trials became the first instances that revealed to the Soviet 
 
 300. AVNER FALK, ANTI-SEMITISM: A HISTORY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS OF 
CONTEMPORARY HATRED 151 (2008). 
 301. See Member States of the United Nations, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un. 
org/en/members/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2012); V Rosssii otmechaiut Mezhdunarodnii den’ 
pamiati dzertv Golokosta [In Russia Mark the International Holocaust Remembrance 
Day], NOVOSTIMIRA.COM (Jan. 27, 2012), http://rss.novostimira.com/n_2099400.html 
(translation by authors); Mishnarodnii den’ pamiatii dzertv Golokostu v Ukraini 
vidznatchaiiut vpiershe [Міжнародний день пам'яті жертв Голокосту в Україні 
відзначають вперше], NOVOSTIMIRA.COM (Jan. 27, 2012), http://rss.novostimira.com/ 
n_2099655.html; International Holocaust Remembrance Day is Commemorated 
in Belarus, UNITED NATIONS IN BELARUS (Jan. 28, 2011), http://unic.un.org/imu/recent 
Activities/post/2011/01/28/International-Holocaust-Remembrance-Day-is-Commemorated- 
in-Belarus.aspx; Adina Dymczyk, Holocaust-Gedenktage In Den Mitgliedsstaaten Der 
Osze [Holocaust Memorial Days in the Member States of the OSCE], GEDENKSTAETTEN 
FORUM [MEMORIALS FORUM], http://www.gedenkstaettenforum.de/nc/gedenkstaetten-
rundbrief/rundbrief/news/holocaust_gedenktage_in_den_mitgliedsstaaten_der_osze (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2012) (translation by authors); Maris Riekstins, Pieminot Holokausta Upurus 
[To Commemorate the Victims of the Holocaust], DIENA (Jan. 27, 2010), http://www.diena.lv/  
sodien-laikraksta/pieminot-holokausta-upurus-715507 (last visited Oct. 25, 2012) (translation 
by authors); International Holocaust Remembrance Day 2012 , TASK FORCE FOR 
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON HOLOCAUST EDUCATION, REMEMBRANCE, AND 
RESEARCH (Jan. 27, 2012), http://www.holocausttaskforce.org/news/400-international-
holocaust-remembrance-day-2012.html. 
 302. Prusin, supra note 29, at 8–9. 
 303. See DONALD M. MCKALE, NAZIS AFTER HITLER: HOW PERPETRATORS OF THE 
HOLOCAUST CHEATED JUSTICE AND TRUTH 85 (2012) (“The Soviet Union refused both 
during and after the war to acknowledge the suffering of its own Jewish citizens (. . . it 
promoted a kind of state-supported Holocaust denial) and recognized only that of its 
‘Soviet’ or ‘anti-Fascist’ peoples . . . .  The government-controlled Soviet press covered 
the trials extensively but downplayed the Holocaust, camouflaging it as the ‘sufferings of 
the Soviet people.’  Newspapers referred ambiguously to the murdered Jews as ‘Soviet 
citizens’ or ‘civilians.’  The word Jew rarely, if ever, appeared in print.”). 
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public the scope of the Jews’ tragedy and made it an inseparable part of 
the history of the Great Patriotic War.”304  At times, the early news reports 
on these trials, as well as press reports during the 1950s and 1960s, did 
specifically identify the victims as Jews.305 
As a result, as at Nuremberg for Western readers, “these war crimes 
trial reports were the first glimpse into the Holocaust for many Soviet 
readers.”306  As Prusin explains: 
The courtroom treatment of the Holocaust reflected the ambivalence of Soviet 
officials’ attitudes towards the murder of the Jews.  While the press referred to 
Jewish victims interchangeably as “Soviet citizens of Jewish nationality” or “Soviet 
civilians,” the testimonies of the defendants, survivors and eyewitnesses brought to 
light a horrifying image of the Nazi killing campaign [against the Jews].307 
In his recent study, McKale observes: 
In contrast to similar Soviet trials during the war[,] . . . the postwar trials introduced 
crimes related to the Holocaust as one of the principal charges against the 
defendants.  While the indictments included a wide range of war crimes perpetrated 
in the former German-occupied Soviet territories, the courts paid particular attention 
to the Holocaust, especially in areas with large prewar Jewish populations.308 
In effect, the mass murder of the Jews was too large a phenomenon to 
ignore during the trials and by the media.  During the trials and in press 
reports, it often became “the elephant in the room” that everyone knew 
about but dare not express openly.  Despite official policy, the genocide 
of the Jews at the hands of the Germans and local collaborators simply 
could not be hidden. 
No other trials in Kharkov of Germans or collaborators following the 
1943 Kharkov trial ever took place.  Nevertheless, the memory of December 
15th—both 1941 (mass murder at Drobitsky Yar) and 1943 (start of the 
Kharkov trial)—remain.  In 1986, “705 Days Prior to Nuremberg,” by 
playwright Zinovy Sagalova, was performed in Kharkov Theater about 
 
 304. Prusin, supra note 29, at 9. 
 305. Crowe, supra note 282. 
 306. Lukasz Hirszowicz, The Holocaust in the Soviet Mirror, 22 E. EUR. JEWISH AFF. 
39, 39–50 (1992); Prusin, supra note 29, at 10.  While not made public until after the fall 
of the Soviet Union, it is noteworthy that the pre-trial interrogation records of captured 
Germans reveal that the alleged perpetrators were asked specifically about actions taken 
against Jews: “Inform the investigation what you know about the destruction of Soviet 
citizens of Jewish nationality [within a given area]” and “[i]nform the investigation about 
your participation in the destruction of the Soviet citizens of Jewish nationality.”  Prusin, 
supra note 29, at 10. 
 307. Prusin, supra note 29, at 18. 
 308. MCKALE, supra note 303.  Yet in the next paragraph, McKale observes that 
“[t]he government-controlled Soviet press covered the trials extensively but downplayed 
the Holocaust.”  Id. 
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the 1943 Kharkov trial events.309  In 1996, the Kharkov Holocaust Museum 
opened in Kharkov, Ukraine “without government support by a band of 
Jewish activists led by Larisa Volovik.”310  It is “housed in three-high 
ceilinged rooms on the second story of a pre-war building on Petrovskogo 
Street in downtown Kharkov” and contains an exhibit devoted to the 
murder campaign against the Jews and the trial at Kharkov in 1943, including 
photos, a documentary of the trials, and other archival materials.311  The 
museum remains the only public Holocaust museum in Ukraine.312 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The first step on the legalist journey for dealing with war criminals in 
a court of law began in Kharkov in 1943 and only later was solidified at 
Nuremberg in 1945 through the “judicialization of World War II atrocities 
in Europe.”313  The trials of Nazis and the national prosecution of other 
perpetrators mark the first time in human history that legalism triumphed 
over vengeance in the aftermath of a war.  Nazi war crimes trials created 
a new paradigm of how those who are responsible for, or directly commit, 
massive state-sponsored atrocities should be treated.  The process of putting 
Nazis and their collaborators on trial continues to this very day, as now-
aging perpetrators are discovered around the world and then usually tried 
for acts committed over a half-century ago.  Since 2000, over seventy Nazis 
or collaborators have been convicted worldwide for crimes during the 
war, with the “last great Nazi war-crimes trial” taking place in 2011 in 
Munich.314  Like Mikhail Bulanov, the collaborator on trial at Kharkov, the 
defendant in Munich, Ivan Demjanjuk, was also a collaborator from the 
Ukraine.315 
 
 309. See generally Нюрнбергский процесс репетировали в Харькове, СЕГОДНЯ, 
22 Декабря 2008, http://www.segodnya.ua/life/stories/njurnberhckij-protsecc-repetirovali-v-
kharkove.html (memories of WWII atrocities and the proceedings of the Nuremburg trial 
are retold) (last visited Oct. 25, 2012). 
 310. DAWSON, supra note 30, at 45–46. 
 311. Id. at 45, 47. 
 312. See DAWSON, supra note 30.  Kiev, the capital of Ukraine and a much larger 
city than Kharkov, has yet to have a museum dedicated to the history of the mass murder 
of Jews in the Ukraine during the Nazi occupation. 
 313. DRUMBL, supra note 236, at 48. 
 314. Lawrence Douglas, Ivan the Recumbent, or Demjanjuk in Munich: Enduring 
the “Last Great Nazi War-Crimes Trial,” HARPER’S MAG., Mar. 2012, at 45–46. 
 315. Id.; Robert McFadden, John Demjanjuk, 91, Dogged by Charges of Atrocities 
as Nazi Camp Guard, Dies, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/ 
03/18/world/europe/john-demjanjuk-nazi-guard-dies-at-91.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all. 
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The courtroom in Kharkov is a predecessor to the courtroom at 
Nuremberg, and the courtrooms today in The Hague of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) in Arusha, Tanzania.  As a consequence, the legalist option 
is also recognized today as the dominant mode for dealing with 
international outlaws, whether they be tyrants or terrorists.  Western liberal 
democracies do not merely summarily execute suspected terrorists or 
their leaders, such as Osama Bin-Laden or Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. 
This option is not seen as viable, in no small part because of the legalist 
road first taken at Kharkov. 
We conclude in the form of a postscript, focusing on the distressing 
phenomenon—likewise illustrated from the Holocaust at Kharkov—that 
the prosecution of most Nazi war criminals either did not take place or, 
if it did, was quickly reversed.316  While the four “small fry” defendants 
on the dock at the Kharkov trial were punished, many of the “large fish” 
and a multitude of other culprits who committed crimes in Kharkov were 
never punished.  In 1968, in the German city of Darmstadt, ten former 
Germans who were part of the 4a detachment were brought to trial for 
the killings of Jews in Eastern Ukraine, including Kharkov.317  Three of 
the ten received no punishment.  Others received sentences, ranging 
from four-to-fifteen years.318 
One notable figure in the Kharkov tragedy, however, was never punished 
for his deeds there.  In December 1945, the Canadians put captured SS 
Brigadier General (Brigadeführer) Kurt Meyer319 on trial before a military 
commission.320  Meyer, at age thirty-three, became in 1944 the Führer’s 
 
 316. Dawson explains the phenomenon: “Hardball geopolitics clearly was at play.  
The U.S. government was anxious about offending West Germany, its new ally against 
the evil empire in Moscow.  Intense lobbying by West German government and church 
officials led to reduced sentences and early freedom for many officers of the Einsatzgruppen, 
the mobile killing squads responsible for murdering over a million Ukrainian Jews.”  
DAWSON, supra note 30, at 20. 
 317. Nazi Crimes on Trial, JUSTIZ UND NS-VERBRECHEN, http://www1.jur.uva. 
nl/junsv/brd/brdengfiles/brdeng694.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2012). 
 318. Id. 
 319. From all indications, Meyer was a life-long and ardent Nazi, fully believing the 
racist ideology of the NSDAP.  During the invasion of Poland, as a young SS officer, he 
ordered the shooting of fifty Polish Jews as a reprisal in the aftermath of the German 
capture of the Polish city of Modlin.  Meyer earned honors from his Nazi superiors for 
his lightening quick capture of Soviet territory during Germany’s June 1941 Operation 
Barbarossa invasion of the Soviet Union.  He was given the moniker “Der schnelle Meyer” 
(“Speedy Meyer”) for the speed by which he captured Soviet territory. GORDON WILLIAMSON, 
GERMAN COMMANDERS OF WORLD WAR II (2): WAFFEN-SS, LUFTWAFFE & NAVY 17–18 
(2006); REITLINGER, supra note 19, at 196. 
 320. CRAIG W.H. LUTHER, BLOOD AND HONOR: THE HISTORY OF THE 12TH SS PANZER 
DIVISION “HITLER YOUTH,” 1943–1945, at 190 (1987). 
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youngest general.321  Meyer also happened to be one of the Waffen-
SS generals who led the military campaign for the German forces’ retaking 
of Kharkov in March 1943.322  In fact, he earned his nickname Panzermeyer 
(“Tank Meyer”) during this battle.323 
As noted earlier, this turned out to be the last major German military 
victory against the Red Army.  A direct order from Hitler on February 13, 
1943, delivered to Meyer personally, commanded Meyer’s troops to 
hold Kharkov at all costs.324  After the bloody recapture of Kharkov by 
the German forces, Hitler awarded Meyer the Knight’s Cross of the Iron 
Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords, the third-highest military decoration 
of the Third Reich.325 
 During this military operation, Meyer apparently ordered the destruction 
of a village named Jefremovka, located near Kharkov, and the murder of 
all its inhabitants.326  He also apparently either directly ordered or had a 
hand in the shooting of Soviet POWs: “Thousands of Soviet soldiers fell 
into the hands of [Meyer’s] . . . Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler division.  
When the Soviets later liberated Kharkov, their bodies were discovered, 
revealing that they had been shot out of hand or after capture.  Meyer 
observed, failed to stop, or instigated the killing of defenseless prisoners of 
war.”327 
Yet, no mention of these atrocities is made in his postwar memoirs, 
published in 1956, where he describes in a gung-ho manner the capture 
of Kharkov.328  He ends the chapter as follows: “The battle of Kharkov 
 
 321. WILLIAMSON, supra note 319, at 18. 
 322. Id. 
 323. REITLINGER, supra note 19. 
 324. See KURT MEYER, GRENADIERS: THE STORY OF WAFFEN SS GENERAL KURT 
“PANZER” MEYER 173 (2005). 
 325. WILLIAMSON, supra note 319, at 18. 
 326. “We have evidence, moreover, from two of Meyer’s own officers, that in one 
case . . . he is said to have destroyed a village called Jefremorka and have put to death all 
its inhabitants, and from the other officer that Meyer himself admitted that on occasion 
in Russia where his forces were cut off it had been necessary to kill prisoners.  He, of 
course, denies this but stresses the fact that fighting in Russia soon became so hard that 
neither side gave quarter and in reprisal for the acts of the other frequently killed 
prisoners.  He admits this much but denies having had anything himself to do with the 
killing of prisoners, or . . . to have any opportunity to do so.” Report of Lieutenant Colonel 
B.J.S. Macdonald, Commanding Officer of Canadian War Crimes Investigation Unit, to 
R.J. Orde, Brigadier Judge Advocate General (Oct. 21, 1945), in KURT MEYER ON TRIAL: 
A DOCUMENTARY RECORD 84 (P. Whitney Lackenbauer & Chris M.V. Madsen eds., 2007). 
 327. Id. at 6. 
 328. See  MEYER,  supra note 324, at 173–96. 
BAZYLER-KHARKOV (DO NOT DELETE) 10/24/2016  5:47 PM 
 
136 
had been conducted victoriously despite considerable losses.  In the great 
battle between the Donez [River] and the Dnjepr [River] the German 
grenadier had emerged victorious over the eastern hordes.”329 
Moved to the Western Front, Meyer participated in battles against 
American, British, and British Commonwealth forces, where he commanded 
the 25th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment of the 12th SS-Waffen Hitler Youth 
Panzer Division, composed primarily of sixteen-to-eighteen-year-old 
soldiers drawn from the Nazi cadet wing, the “Hitler Youth.”330 
Captured in 1944 by Belgian partisans and turned over to the Americans, 
Meyer was put on trial in occupied Germany by the Canadians for ordering 
the shooting of forty-one captured Canadian POWs during the Normandy 
campaign from June 7, 1944 through June 8, 1944.331  Taking care of their 
own, the Canadians did not bring charges for any of Meyer’s activities in 
Poland or in the Soviet Union, including Kharkov, or seek assistance 
from the Russians or the Poles.332  He was tried in December 1945 before a 
military court consisting of five Canadian generals solely for ordering his 
soldiers at Normandy to execute captured enemy soldiers, thereby violating 
laws of warfare.333  
After a trial lasting over two weeks, the Canadian generals found the 
Nazi general guilty of most of the charges on the basis of the command 
responsibility principle and sentenced him to death.334  However, the 
Convening Authority superior officer reviewing the sentence commuted 
it to life imprisonment on the grounds that Meyer’s degree of responsibility 
did not warrant the extreme penalty.335 
During the trial, Bruce Macdonald, the Canadian chief military 
prosecutor, tried to delve into Meyer’s experience with prisoners on the 
Eastern Front against the Soviets, but he was cut short by the military 
court president.336  In his account of the trial, Macdonald refers to the 
allegations he would have pursued if allowed to question Meyer about 
his activities on the Eastern Front:  
Anecdotes about [Meyer’s] methods of fighting in Russia were common.  It was 
said that with his Reconnaissance Unit he had several times penetrated the 
Russian lines and permitted himself to be encircled, but preserving, if he could, 
 
 329. Id. at 196. 
 330. WILLIAMSON, supra note 319, at 18. 
 331. LUTHER, supra note 320, at 188, 191. 
 332. See id. at 191. 
 333. See generally Canada v. Meyer, 4 L.R.T.W.C. 97 (1948); see also PATRICK BRODE, 
CASUAL SLAUGHTER AND JUDGMENT: CANADIAN WAR CRIMES PROSECUTION 1944–1948, 
at 20 (1997). 
 334. LUTHER, supra note 320, at 192. 
 335. Id. 
 336. KURT MEYER ON TRIAL: A DOCUMENTARY RECORD 393, 397 (P. Whitney 
Lackenbauer & Chris M.V. Madsen eds., 2007). 
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a way out.  He would then destroy an entire village with all its inhabitants, men, 
women, and even small children.  When questioned about this, he said that the 
shooting of prisoners in such a situation was necessary because they could not 
be brought back to the German positions.  
Another story, told by an S.S. sergeant, was that at another place in Russia he 
did the same thing in retaliation for the unintentional killing of one of his two 
German shepherd dogs which were said to have been given to him by Hitler.337 
After his conviction by the Canadian military court in occupied Germany, 
Meyer was taken by ship to Canada to serve his life sentence.338  He 
became the only Nazi war criminal convicted by the Western Allies to 
be imprisoned outside of Germany.339 
In 1951, as a result of a campaign waged by his supporters back home, 
Meyer was transferred to a British military prison in Germany.340  He 
was released in 1954, ten years to the day after being captured by the 
partisans.341  Meyer spent the remainder of his life in West Germany, 
working as a beer salesman selling beer to bases where Canadian troops, 
oddly enough, were stationed in Germany.342  Treated with respect by his 
fellow Germans, Meyer became actively involved in an organization of 
Waffen-SS veterans, HIAG (Hilfsorganisation aug Gegenseitigkeit der 
Waffen-SS or “Mutual Aid Society of the Waffen-SS”).343  He became a 
spokesperson for HIAG and unsuccessfully campaigned for West Germany 
to grant pensions to former members of the Waffen-SS, which was branded 
a “criminal organization” by the IMT at Nuremberg.344  In 1961, Meyer, 
on his fifty-first birthday, suddenly died of a heart attack.345 
Meyer remained unapologetic until the end.  His 1957 memoir 
Grenadiers—a bestseller in Germany that went through multiple 
editions, and was translated into French and English—describes the 
surprise invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 as a campaign “to do 
away with the worldwide threat of Bolshevism forever.”346  The memoir is 
surreal, devoid of even one mention of Jews (including the gas vans used 
in Kharkov to murder them), the massive killing operations of civilians 
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conducted by the Germans, or the Einsatzgruppen killing squads working 
alongside Meyer’s troops.  The memoirs contain vivid descriptions of 
atrocities witnessed by Meyer—all committed by Red Army or other Allied 
troops.347  His trial by Canadians took place only because “[a] new 
international law came into effect [after defeat of Nazi Germany]—
the victors’ justice.”348 
Meyer denied until the end having any knowledge of concentration or 
extermination centers.  In a 1957 interview with a Canadian reporter, he 
stated: “I never saw a concentration camp.”349  As to persecution of Jews, 
he replied evasively, “I have only seen soldiers and not politicians.”350  
Meyer’s ordering and participation of atrocities in Kharkov, as well as 
those which occurred earlier in Poland, were forgotten and he was never 
brought to justice by the Germans for these acts. Sadly, Meyer is 
remembered today only as a brilliant military commander, achieving cult 
status among military historians and military buffs.  The Internet today 
contains numerous sites selling miniatures of SS-General Meyer, 
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